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Semantic models help to achieve semantic interoperability among sources of data
and applications. The necessity to efficiently manage these types of objects has
increased the number of specialized repositories, usually referred to as ‘seman-
tic databases’ or ‘semantic repositories’. Semantic repositories and ontologies are
gaining popularity in information and communication technology as well as in
various applications such as healthcare, content management and life sciences, as
an adequate way of accomplishing complex information-management tasks. An
increasing number of project initiatives choose to formalize application knowledge
using ontologies and semantic data representation. Access restrictions are nec-
essary in standard information systems and have become an issue for semantic
repositories. Due to the varying sensitivity of data, suitable access control mech-
anisms pertaining to a semantic repository should be in place in order to ensure
that users can obtain access only to information they are authorized to see.
To enforce semantic authorizations in semantic knowledge bases, the semantic
storage model is inefficient. Most semantic storage models support a monolithic
schema with a single storage layer that stores all statements. To improve storage
efficiency and enable effective management of semantic data, a semantic storage
model is proposed in this thesis. The model also helps in designing flexible access
restrictions in a semantic repository. Subsequently, this thesis presents an infer-
ence policy engine framework that employs authorization control to systematically
secure access to, and prevent knowledge leakage from, a semantic knowledge base.
In addition, this thesis highlights the need to enhance authorization security across
semantically heterogeneous repositories. Many organizations often have a need
to share semantic knowledge-based content with selected members of other or-
ganizations, but sharing semantic knowledge across different organizations needs
iii
solutions for several problems. Differences in the vocabulary utilized by the orga-
nizations have to be resolved before knowledge can be shared. Also, if semantic
databases are syntactically and schematically heterogeneous, information interop-
eration becomes a vital challenge. In order to allow users from multiple organi-
zations to access different semantic database systems, a good semantic mediator
access control mechanism is needed. In this thesis, a mediation system framework
is proposed for secure interoperation among heterogeneous semantic repositories.
The mediation system ensures flexibility of control and secure sharing of hetero-
geneous knowledge.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Chapter Plan:
1.1 Motivation (1)
1.2 Problem Statement (4)
1.3 Thesis Contributions (6)
1.4 Thesis Organisation (7)
1.1 Motivation
The Semantic Web is an initiative of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
to provide a common framework that allows data, information and knowledge to
be shared and reused across applications, enterprises, and community boundaries
[Antoniou and vanHarmelen, 2004; Lee et al., 2001]. It represents a wealth of data
1
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where information is published and interlinked in a way that allows both humans
and machines to exploit its structure and meaning. In order to realize the Seman-
tic Web, the W3C developed a series of semantic models and query languages for
it [Bechhofer et al., 2004; Lassila and Swick, 1999; Prud’hommeaux and Seaborne,
2006]. The W3C’s Semantic Web models include the Resource Description Frame-
work (RDF), the Web Ontology Language (OWL), and SPARQL Query Language
which provide a scalable framework for semantic data integration, harmonization
and sharing [Bechhofer, 2002; Pulido et al., 2006].
Semantic models are progressively growing in popularity, especially in the area
of information integration. In this context, ontologies can be utilized to create a
shared terminology between parties that need to communicate and to specify the
semantics of the information stored in heterogeneous data repositories, thereby
achieving semantic compatibility. On the other hand, the structure and dynamic
character of the Semantic Web is a problematical issue for many traditional ap-
proaches like data indexing and querying. Therefore, there is a real need for
efficient tools for storing and querying knowledge using ontologies and related re-
sources. In this context, the annotation of unstructured data has become essential
in order to increase the efficiency of query processing. Efficient semantic data
storage and query processing that scales well and can handle large amounts of
possibly schema-less data has become a substantial research topic [Kiryakov and
Damova, 2011].
Managing data on the Web presents a tremendous challenge, considering the size
of data, the anticipated number of requests, and the desirable response times. This
has motivated the development of repositories specifically designed to effectively
store and manipulate semantic models. Such repositories are referred to as ‘se-
mantic repositories’, or ‘semantic databases’. Semantic repository tools are needed
that bring together characteristics of semantic management stores with inference
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capability to support efficient manipulation of semantic data [Ding et al., 2007;
Kiryakov and Damova, 2011].
Semantic repositories, originally developed for knowledge representation and rea-
soning, are gaining attention in different domains including industry, healthcare,
content management and life sciences as an adequate means of accomplishing com-
plex information management tasks. The use of semantic repositories is expected
to increase in the future (Figure 1.1) [Cardoso, 2007; Daconta et al., 2003; De Vir-
gilio et al., 2012; Dietzold and Auer, 2006]. In fact, the development of semantic
repositories contributes to the success of many applications in different domains
via enhancing query processing performance by using hierarchical knowledge and
improving the interoperability, exchange, access, and usability of ontologies. As
semantic repositories are being increasingly used in real-world applications, the
protection of the semantic model to prevent unauthorized access becomes an im-
portant consideration.
W
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Time
Figure 1.1: Evolution towards Semantic Technologies
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In this thesis, the semantic model represents the family of the models capturing
a conceptualization but not actual instantiation. Semantic data actually speaks
about concrete objects (called instances) and their relationships. In fact, the term
semantic data is frequently used in the Semantic Web community to refer to data
that has been captured using Semantic Web languages RDF and OWL.
1.2 Problem Statement
Following the enthusiasm about the Semantic Web and the wide adoption of the re-
lated standards, most of today’s semantic repositories are database engines dealing
with data represented in RDF, supporting SPARQL queries, and capable of inter-
preting schemas and ontologies [Bechhofer, 2002; Bechhofer et al., 2004; Kiryakov
and Damova, 2011; Prud’hommeaux and Seaborne, 2006]. A repository is often
the core of a system, storing and managing extracted facts and information; a se-
mantic repository stores semantic data and provides a management environment
for a semantic ontology knowledge base. At present, a large number of semantic
repositories such as Sesame, YARS2, Jena, and AllegroGraph [Aduna, 2008; Franz,
2010; Harth et al., 2007; McBride, 2002] are accessible as proprietary solutions or
open source projects. In all of these applications, the semantic model stores the
data of the domain or serves as a mediator for the data sources.
In spite of the great success of semantic repositories and related projects, seman-
tic repositories lack specific security measures to regulate access to the semantic
model’s entities (concepts) and their individuals (instances). Access control to
the semantic data repositories has not been addressed in sufficient detail. This
issue might significantly affect the progress and future of semantic repositories.
An extensible architecture, that allows for efficient handling of semantic autho-
rization control to secure semantic data repositories, is required to address the
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issue. Designing semantic authorization control for secure semantic data reposito-
ries requires an answer to the following research questions:
(A) How can a semantic knowledge base be efficiently managed and stored in per-
sistent semantic storage?
To reduce the overhead of security mechanisms, storage efficiency needs to be
improved. A semantic storage model is proposed in this thesis to improve the
performance of semantic repositories, and to enhance authorization security
framework by providing enhanced storage capabilities at the semantic knowl-
edge representation.
(B) How can access rights be enforced on a semantic model’s entities and their
individuals in the semantic repository through an inference policy engine?
The granting of authorization privileges to a semantic model’s entities and their
individuals should be addressed in order to prevent knowledge leakage and to
maintain high-quality services through secure access to the knowledge base. A
semantic reasoner authorization model is proposed for safeguarding semantic
data repositories using an inference policy engine which employs authorization
control to systematically secure access to, and prevent knowledge leakage from,
a semantic knowledge base.
(C) How can a hierarchical role-based model be enhanced in order to provide flex-
ible permission inheritance and support both inheritable and non-inheritable
permissions?
The focus is on exploring a new strategy to administer hierarchy within a se-
mantic reasoner authorization model to achieve the convenience of relying on
the inheritance characteristics within the role hierarchy structure.
(D) How can authorization security be enhanced across semantically heteroge-
neous repositories?
This thesis also highlights the need to enhance authorization security across
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semantically heterogeneous repositories. A mediator authorization-security
model is designed for heterogeneous semantic repositories, which enables the
secure sharing of semantic knowledge bases among diverse organizations.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The objective of this thesis is twofold: on the one hand to propose a functional
access control model for semantic repositories. The aim also is to design a practical
framework that improves security support for semantic repositories. Any access to
a semantic repository store is routed through an inference policy engine to decide
whether the user has permission to perform the read request on an object. On the
other hand, its purpose is to enhance authorization security across semantically
heterogeneous repositories. The thesis results include:
• A methodology to enhance a semantic storage model to efficiently store a se-
mantic knowledge base, thereby providing enhanced capabilities to help sup-
port the authorization structure in semantic repositories.
• A multi-layered authorization control model is proposed which is a combination
of ‘security role & labelling technique’ whereby many security properties can
be determined by the expressiveness of the authorization scheme, a powerful
authorization system and multi-level security.
• Authorization propagation technique based on the semantic relationship among
concepts to protect semantic data from both unauthorized access and malicious
corruption.
• Role-based administration for an enhanced hierarchical model in a semantic
authorization system.
• Conflict management to address the conflicts due to the multiple inheritance.
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• Mediator authorization-security model for secure interoperation among hetero-
geneous semantic repositories.
Figure 1.2 shows the structure of the thesis.
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Figure 1.2: Thesis structure
The following section provides a detailed architecture of the proposed system with
the required components. It also provides an overview of the chapters of this thesis
and their related architecture components.
1.4 Thesis Organisation
The overall architecture of semantic authorization control for secure semantic data
repositories is depicted in Figure 1.3. The orange blocks indicate which parts of
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the architecture are covered by topics in the chapters of this thesis. The following
gives an overview of the architecture and the topics covered in the chapters.
Chapter 2 introduces technical preliminaries to help the understanding of this the-
sis’ technical concepts and results. It covers semantic web technology, semantic
repositories, linked data, description logic knowledge representation with a number
of ontology languages that have been developed for the representation of ontolo-
gies on the World Wide Web, RDF-Based data representation models, and query
frameworks for RDF.
Chapter 3 discusses the most prominent semantic technology stores. It also de-
scribes the strengths and weaknesses of several current semantic data access control
mechanisms.
Chapter 4 provides a new representation of a semantic storage system to improve
storage efficiency and enable effective management of semantic data. Section 4.1
summarizes the components of semantic knowledge representation. Section 4.2
gives an overview of semantic triple store representation. Section 4.3 proposes a
methodology to enhance the semantic storage model to efficiently store semantic
knowledge bases and to enhance the semantic authorization system related to the
ontology repositories. Section 4.4 examines the storage environment for querying
capabilities.
Chapter 5 provides authorization control for a semantic data repository through
an inference policy engine. Section 5.1 shows two examples that will be used to
illustrate the method proposed in the discussions throughout the chapter. Section
5.2 presents the semantic reasoner authorization model architecture. Sections 5.3-
5.6 specify the components of the architecture of the model. Section 5.7 shows the
test setting for the semantic reasoner authorization model.
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Chapter 6 provides an enhanced hierarchical model for the semantic authorization
system. Section 6.1 gives a description of the semantic reasoner authorization
model based on core role-based access control (RBAC). It also describes several
scenarios that demonstrate how inheritance rights produce undesirable results.
Section 6.2.1 presents a new mechanism for permission inheritance within a role
hierarchy. Section 6.2.2 provides conflict analysis and proposes a conflict resolution
method for the semantic reasoner authorization model. Section 6.3 analyses the
complexity and CPU performance efficiency of the extended inheritance model.
Chapter 7 provides a mediator model for heterogeneous semantic knowledge bases.
Section 7.1 presents the proposed model: the mediator authorization-security
model. It describes the main components that are used to secure access across
semantically heterogeneous repositories. Section 7.1.1 shows the design and ar-
chitecture of semantic payload caching which improves the performance of the
mediator model. Section 7.2 shows a motivation example to illustrate the pro-
posed mediator model. Section 7.3 describes the test setting for the mediator
authorization-security model.
Chapter 8 summarizes the technical and empirical outcomes of the PhD project
and suggests directions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
Chapter Plan:
2.1 Semantic Web Technologies (12)
2.2 Description Logics in the Semantic Web (16)
2.3 Overview of the Web Ontology Model (18)
2.4 Semantic Repository (24)
2.5 RDF-based Data Representation Model (28)
2.6 A Query Framework for RDF (28)
2.7 Linked Data (31)
This chapter introduces the necessary preliminaries together with the fundamental
related background for this thesis. It is organized as follows.
First, an introduction to the Semantic Web is given. It further introduces the
historical context and the architecture of the Semantic Web technology.
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Second, Description Logics is introduced together with its history and applications
with a focus on the Semantic Web.
Third, number of ontology languages are introduced that have been developed for
the representation of ontologies on the World Wide Web.
Fourth, semantic repositories are described followed by a discussion of their links
to several other technology trends, including relational databases.
Fifth, an introduction is given to the RDF-Based data representation model and
query framework for RDF. The last section presents the main principles of linked
data.
2.1 Semantic Web Technologies
The Semantic Web has been recognized as the next generation Web which aims
at the automation, integration and reuse of data across different web applications.
Semantic Web Technologies are a family of very specific technology standards from
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) designed to describe and relate data on
the Web and inside enterprises. The initiative was inspired by Tim Berners-Lee,
father of the Web, who envisaged a more flexible, automatic, integrated, and self-
adapting Web which provided a richer and more interactive experience for users. In
fact, the Semantic Web initiative was started as the Web Metadata Working Group
in 1998, and subsequently became the Semantic Web activity that “...provides a
common framework that allows data to be shared and reused across application,
enterprise, and community boundaries”. After that, semantic technology work has
moved forward within W3C with increased vigour [Antoniou and vanHarmelen,
2004; Lee et al., 2001].
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Currently, the core technological building blocks of the Semantic Web are now
in place and widely available: ontology languages, flexible storage and querying
facilities, reasoning engines, etc., providing richer standards and guidelines for
best practice formulated and disseminated by the W3C. The overall objective of
Semantic Web techniques is to build online end-user applications that integrate,
combine and deduce information needed to assist users in performing tasks.
In order to execute these tasks, a layered architecture has been developed for the
Semantic Web which is illustrated in Figure 2.1 as proposed by Tim Berners-Lee
[Lee et al., 2001]. In the following, we discuss the Semantic Web layers in detail,
describing how the combination of each layer provides the architecture for the
Semantic Web [Antoniou and vanHarmelen, 2004].
Figure 2.1: Semantic Web Architecture
Unicode: Unicode is the standard for computer character representation. It is
intended to uniquely identify the characters in all the written languages by as-
signing a unique number to each character. Also, it is used to encode the data
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in the repository. The Unicode Standard is specified by the Unicode Consortium.
The Unicode Consortium is a non-profit organisation founded to develop, extend
and promote use of the Unicode Standard and also to ensure consistency in the
implementation and interchange of Unicode data. The standard supports three
encoding mechanisms, UTF-8, UTF-16 and UTF-32, which allows the same data
to be encoded in a byte, word or double word format (i.e. in 8, 16 or 32-bits per
code unit). All three encoding mechanisms encode the same common characters
and can be transformed into one another. Any of these encoding methods is ac-
cepted as a way to implement the Unicode Standard [The Unicode Consortium,
1996].
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a string of a standardized form that
allows the unique identification of resources such as pages on the Web. Briefly,
it is used for identifying and locating resources on the Web and in a repository.
In the Semantic Web, it is generally used to develop syntaxes which use URIs to
represent data, usually in triples-based structures: i.e. many triples of URI data
that can be held in databases or interchanged on the World Wide Web using a set
of particular syntaxes developed especially for the task. These syntaxes are called
“Resource Description Framework” RDF syntaxes.
Extensible Markup Language (XML): The Semantic Web should smoothly inte-
grate with the Web, thus, it must be interwoven with Web documents. HTML
has specifically designed structure that is not enough to capture all that is going
to be expressible in the Semantic Web. XML is a superset of HTML that can
be utilized to provide the serialisation syntax for the Semantic Web. XML was
tried in the beginning but more recently other possibilities have been developed.
Therefore, XML and its related standards such as XML Schemas, and Namespaces
are commonly used for structuring data on the Web but without communicating
the meaning of the data.
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Resource Description Framework: The RDF Model and syntax specification
define the first layer and the building blocks to realise the Semantic Web. RDF
is a simple metadata representation framework, using URIs to identify Web-based
resources and an RDF graph model for describing relationships between resources
by defining a structure composed of nodes and directed edges between nodes. The
structure nodes and edges define directed graphs that model the network of terms
and relations between terms of the Semantic Web. The nodes and relations are
called ‘resources’ and are identified by URIs. Each node has its own URI and the
types of relations also have URI; these are called ‘properties’.
RDF Schema: defines extensions to RDF that are utilized to define common vocab-
ularies in RDF meta-data statements. The basic RDF provides the data model
and does not describe concepts (classes) and properties; this is accomplished by
RDF Schema. RDF schema is a type of modelling language for describing groups
of related resources and the relationships between these resources (i.e. concepts
of resources and properties) in the basic RDF model. It also provides a simple
reasoning framework for inferring types of resources.
Ontologies: The term ‘ontology’ has been inherited from philosophy and is now
applied to knowledge engineering, where ontology is comprised of concepts, prop-
erties, relationships between concepts and constraints. Generally, it is a richer se-
mantic language for providing more complex constraints to the types of resources
and their properties. RDF Schemas metadata vocabularies can be considered sim-
plified ontologies. Therefore, when the expressiveness achieved with semantic tools
is not enough, ontologies can enrich a semantic description.
Logic and Proof: is a reasoning system provided on top of the ontology struc-
ture that is automatic to make new inferences. Thus, its purpose is such that a
software agent using this system can deduce whether a particular resource satisfies
its requirements (and vice versa). Thus, the logic and proof layer aims to establish
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logical principles on the Semantic Web that allow agents to make inferences and
deductions. So this layer will enhance representation and reasoning capabilities.
Trust: The final layer of the Semantic Web architecture addresses issues of trust
that the Semantic Web can support. This layer has not progressed much beyond
a vision which allows people to ask questions about the trustworthiness of the
information on the Web, in order to receive an assurance of its quality.
2.2 Description Logics in the Semantic Web
Description Logic systems [Baader et al., 2003; Haarslev and Mller, 2003] empha-
size the use of formal knowledge representation and reasoning systems as their
primary mode of inference services that deduce implicit knowledge from the ex-
plicitly represented knowledge, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. For these inference
services to be feasible in practice, the underlying inference problems must at least
be decidable, which is one of the characteristics of DLs.
DLs, the knowledge representation languages, are embodied in many knowledge-
based systems and have been used in a range of various real-life applications. The
most standard application is the Semantic Web. The W3C developed and recom-
mended the Web Ontology Language (OWL) as the standard ontology language
for the Semantic Web [Bechhofer et al., 2004]. The logical basis of OWL can be
characterized with the DL. We will go into more detail of the description logics in
the Semantic Web below. A variety of further DL applications, including natural
language processing, configuration of technical systems, heterogeneous databases,
software information systems, integration, support for planning, etc., is described
in the Description Logic Handbook [Baader et al., 2003].
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Description logics in the Semantic Web: It has long been realized that the
Web would benefit from having its content made available in a machine-processable
form, which allows computers to interpret data. While the Web language HTML
has addressed presentation and text formatting rather than content, languages
such as XML offer some support for capturing the meaning of Web content. The
concept of the Semantic Web is considered as an evolution from a linked docu-
ment repository into a platform where “information is given well-defined meaning,
better enabling computers and people to work in cooperation” [Lee et al., 2001].
This is to be accomplished by increasing the existing planning information with
semantic annotations that add descriptive terms to Web content, with the mean-
ing of these terms being defined in the ontologies. The DARPA Agent Markup
Language (DAML) and Ontology Inference Layer (OIL) ontology languages for the
Semantic Web can be regarded as syntactic variants of DLs [Horrocks, 2002] and
have been the starting point for the W3C Web Ontology Working Group. Also, in
2004, they finished their work with more expressive representation language “the
OWL standard” [Bechhofer et al., 2004].
Figure 2.2: Description Logic Model
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2.3 Overview of the Web Ontology Model
Ontologies are metadata schemas that provide controlled vocabularies of terms
and allow the encoding of knowledge about specific domains. They often include
reasoning rules that support the processing of that knowledge. A number of on-
tology languages have been developed for the representation of ontologies on the
World Wide Web. Some recent ontology languages include the Resource Descrip-
tion Framework, simple HTML ontology extensions, the ontology interchange lan-
guage, and the DARPA Agent Mark-up Language. In this section, we will provide
a brief overview of these ontology languages [Bechhofer, 2002; Falkovych et al.,
2003; Pulido et al., 2006; Saha, 2007; Smith et al., 2004].
RDF and RDF Schema: The Resource Description Framework (RDF) is a
standard for the Web metadata that provides interoperability between applications
that exchange machine-understandable information in a meaningful way on the
Web. Essentially, it uses XML syntax to describe resources on the Web. The
broad goal of RDF is to add formal semantics to the web and provide a data model
and syntax convention to represent the semantics of the data in a standardized
manner. The RDF schema (RDFS) has been introduced as a layer on top of the
basic RDF model, which lets developers define a particular vocabulary for RDF
data and specify the type of objects to which these attributes may be applied
[Bechhofer, 2002; Falkovych et al., 2003; Pulido et al., 2006].
SHOE: Simple HTML Ontology Extensions give authors the ability to add se-
mantic content to Web pages and provide an extension to HTML, which allows the
incorporation of machine-readable semantic knowledge in HTML or other World-
Wide Web documents. SHOE has two syntactical variations. The first syntax
is the Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML application) that extends
the HTML syntax with additional semantic tags. The second SHOE syntax is an
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XML application. While the SGML syntax enables SHOE to be embedded in the
numerous existing HTML Web pages, the XML syntax enables SHOE to leverage
emerging Web standards and technologies [Heflin et al., 2003].
OIL: The Ontology Inference Layer (OIL) was developed in the On-to-Knowledge
project as a language for a web-based representation and inference layer for on-
tologies. It is compatible with the RDF Schema and is an extension of the RDF
and RDF Schema, which provides a standardized syntax for writing ontologies as
well as a standard set of modelling primitives. OIL is not sufficiently expressive
for use as an ontology language [Fensel et al., 2001].
DAML: The DARPA Agent Mark-up Language (DAML) was developed in par-
allel with OIL, and aims to provide the foundation for the next Web evolution,
the Semantic Web. DAML is composed of the ontology language and a language
for expressing constraints and adding inference rules. It also has mappings to
other Semantic Web languages such as SHOE, OIL, XML, and RDF [Hendler and
Deborah, 2000].
DAML+OIL: The name DAML+OIL stems from the combination of OIL and
DAML. This language replaced DAML as the standard language of the DAML
project’s March 2001 version. DAML+OIL have clean and well-defined model-
theoretic semantics as well as an axiomatic specification, which defines the in-
tended interpretation of the language. DAML+OIL is, in essence, equivalent to
a very expressive DL, with a DAML+OIL ontology corresponding to a DL ter-
minology. A DAML+OIL ontology (or knowledge base) takes an object-oriented
approach, with the structure of the domain being described in terms of concepts
and properties. A variety of constructors are provided for building concept ex-
pressions. A DAML+OIL ontology consists of a set of axioms that assert the
characteristics of these concepts and properties [Horrocks et al., 2002].
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OWL: The Web Ontology Language (OWL) has become a W3C recommendation
and standard ontology language for creating Semantic Web applications. OWL is
a revision of the DAML+OIL Web ontology language with various levels of expres-
sivity included in the language as illustrated in Figure 2.3 which shows that OWL
developed as a vocabulary extension of RDF and is derived from the DAML+OIL
Web Ontology Language. There are three species of OWL ontology: Lite, DL,
and Full, which will be explained in detail in the next section [Bechhofer et al.,
2004; Saha, 2007; Smith et al., 2004].
Figure 2.3: OWL developed as a vocabulary extension of RDF and is derived
from the DAML+OIL Web Ontology Language
2.3.1 Web Ontology Language OWL
The OWL ontology language is considered the most promising semantic ontology
language built upon the syntax of RDF and RDF schema; it facilitates the sharing
of information by identifying the types of relationships that can be expressed via
RDF/XML syntax to explain the hierarchies and relationships between different
resources and can be utilized as a data repository. Hence, OWL is an expressive
formalism for conceptual modelling to define various logical concepts and relations.
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There are three species of OWL ontologies: OWL Lite, OWL DL, and OWL
Full. Every OWL Lite ontology is also an OWL DL ontology, and every OWL DL
ontology is a legal OWL Full ontology [Bechhofer, 2002; Falkovych et al., 2003;
Pulido et al., 2006; Saha, 2007; Smith et al., 2004] (Figure 2.4).
1. OWL Lite is the simplest OWL language, and is intended to support those
users who require a classification hierarchy and simple constraints. It in-
cludes a restricted vocabulary sufficient to satisfy basic user needs.
2. OWL DL was originally designed to support those users who need to provide
maximum expressiveness while retaining computational completeness. The
W3C states that, “OWL DL includes all OWL language constructs, but they
can be used only under certain restrictions (for example, while a concept
may be a subconcept of many concepts, a concept cannot be an individual
of another concept)”[McGuinness and van Harmelen, 2004].
3. OWL Full is a species of the OWL ontology language that is based on
a different semantics from OWL Lite or OWL DL, and was designed to
preserve some compatibility with RDF both at the syntactic and semantic
level.
Figure 2.4: OWL Syntactic Subsets (Profiles)
Chapter 2. Background 22
Specifically, OWL provides mechanisms to represent all the components of ontol-
ogy: concepts, properties (or relations), individuals, axioms and facts [Bechhofer,
2002; Falkovych et al., 2003; Pulido et al., 2006; Saha, 2007; Smith et al., 2004].
Concept elements
Concepts (Classes) represent an abstraction mechanism for grouping individuals
with similar characteristics (properties). Concepts in OWL are usually organized
in a specialization hierarchy (taxonomy) based on the superconcept-subconcept re-
lation. OWL comes with two predefined concepts:“owl:Thing” which is the most
general concept >, the root concept and “owl:Nothing” is an empty concept ⊥
that has no individuals. Consequently, every OWL concept is a subconcept of
owl:Thing, and owl:Nothing is a subconcept of every concept.
Property elements
In OWL, a property is a binary relation connecting concepts and can be further
distinguished as Object Property or Datatype Property.
• Object property represents the relation between individuals of two concepts
(relate individuals to other individuals),
• Datatype property represents the relation between individuals of concepts and
literal values such as xsd:number, xsd:string, and xsd:date.
Properties can have a specified domain and range1. OWL uses built-in datatypes
supported by XML Schema, which is referenced using: http://www.w3.org/2001/XML-
Schema#name. The following example shows the datatype property specifying
money currency is xsd:string. Also, object property ‘cost’ represents the relation
between two concepts ‘purchaseableItem’ and money.
1The domain is the concept of the subject individual; the range is the concept of the object
individual (or a datatype if hasProperty is a Datatype Property)
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<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="currency">
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Money"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="cost">
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#PurchaseableItem"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Money"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty>
Instances (Individuals)
Instances represent individuals in an ontology and are defined as the actual entities.
The following example shows that Jason is an individual of postgraduate student
concept (Figure 2.5).
<owl:Thing rdf:about="#Jason">
<rdf:type rdf:resource="#PostgraduateStudent"/>
</owl:Thing>
TakeCourse
DegreeFrom
Jason
Bob
Course
PostgraduateStudent
ADB
Java
University
RMIT
Cambridge
Figure 2.5: Ontology Individuals Example
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OWL Terminological (TBox) Axioms and Assertional (ABox) Axioms
OWL ontology consists of two parts: a TBox (Terminological Box), and an ABox
(Assertions Box). A TBox is a set of “schema” axioms (sentences), where concepts
(and their hierarchy) and relations between concepts are defined. An ABox is a
set of “data” axioms (ground facts). ABox axioms are assertions (or statements)
that state information about a particular individual in the form of a concept to
which the individual belongs or its relationship with other individuals.
2.4 Semantic Repository
Semantic repositories allow for storage, querying, and management of semantic
data [Kiryakov and Damova, 2011; Lassila et al., 2000]. They provide an efficient
way to meaningfully manage structured data. While semantic repositories are
engines similar to database management systems (DBMS), the major differences
with DBMSs can be summarized as follows:
- They use ontologies as semantic schema which allow performing automatic
reasoning on the data they store.
- They work with generic physical data models (e.g. graphs) which allows to
easily interpret and adopt extensions in the schemas, in other words, in the
structure of the data.
Over the last decade, the Semantic Web stood out as an area where the semantic
repositories become as important as the HTTP servers. This tendency has at-
tracted very high interest and activity in the field and also resulted in a number of
powerful semantic metadata and ontology standards delivered by the W3C-driven
community processes, most notable among which are RDFS and OWL .
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Practically, semantic repositories can be considered essentially DBMSs that can
interpret the data. Based on the semantics of the schemas, implicit facts can be
inferred and considered in the process of query evaluation.
As an illustration of this, Figure 2.6 gives an example of data representation and
interpretation in semantic repositories and the facts that can be inferred from
those. Two explicit facts were asserted in the repository (the solid blue arcs):
“book1 is an Article” and “Sara is a student”. The effective direct benefit of the
semantic repository when interpreting the data is that it can evaluate queries (or
more generally retrieval requests) in a much “cleverer” and more flexible manner.
For instance, in the above example, the repository was able to infer several new
facts (the dashed black arcs) (e.g., by the retrieval query pattern ?x created By
Sara). The query pattern is more general than the fact asserted. The relation in
the query goes in the subset direction. In this case, book1 and book 2 from article
and journal concepts are created by Sara.
Figure 2.6: Data representation and interpretation in semantic repositories
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From this context, the semantic repositories allow query variation with respect to
the level of generality and the direction of the relation between two entities. More
precisely, the expression of the information in the query no longer has to match
the syntax of data assertion. This allows a whole new level of information access
scenarios, where the user who formulates the query is not aware of the details of
the schemas that were used for encoding the data. This is possible only in database
management systems where the engine is aware of the semantics of data and the
query, and interprets them in order to find matches despite syntactic variations.
This is the major difference between semantic repositories and XML-based DBMS.
XML is designed to allow interoperability with respect to the syntax of the data
which remain ignorant to its semantics.
Figure 2.7 presents a comparison of the representation of the data in relational
DBMS and the semantic databases where each arc from the graph is represented
as a triple (s,p,o):
- s: subject represents the source node;
- p: predicate (the property) represents the type of relation or the attribute;
- o: object represents the target node, or the value. More details are given in
Chapter 4.
A change in the schema such as the definition of a new property, imposes no
changes in the representation of the asserted facts in the semantic database, be-
cause it does not change the structure in the physical representation. However, in
a relational DBMS, the physical representation of the data schema is dependent
on the schema and any change in the schema requires considerable re-arrangement
of the data files.
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Figure 2.7: Row stores versus semantic databases (RDF Triple)
In summary, semantic repositories can be defined as “RDF-based column-stores
with inference capabilities”. The following lists the main characteristics and ad-
vantages of semantic repositories:
• Easy integration of multiple data sources: Once the schemas of these sources
have been aligned semantically, the engine’s inference abilities support the
combination as well as interlinking of the facts from the varied sources.
• Simple querying against diverse, rich or unknown information schemas: In-
ference is applicable in matching the query’s semantics to the data’s seman-
tics, regardless of the vocabulary and data modelling patterns utilized for
data encoding.
• Outstanding analytical power: A user can trust that the semantics will be
comprehensively applicable even when multiple-step recursive inferences are
required. Hence, semantic repositories can uncover facts, founded on the
long chains of evidences interlinking the immense bulk of those facts that
remain concealed in a normal DBMS.
• Data interoperability capability: The import of RDF data from one partic-
ular store to another is clear-cut, and enabled by globally unique identifiers.
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2.5 RDF-based Data Representation Model
RDF is a language that represents data pertaining to World Wide Web resources
[Kiryakov and Damova, 2011]. While it was created to represent metadata re-
garding Web resources, RDF has a greater utilization as a generic data model for
structured data management and reasoning. At this point, an outline of a num-
ber of augmentations of the fundamental RDF specifications is shown that are
pertinent to its use as a data representation model in semantic repositories.
In the RDF data model, a data element represents a statement about a re-
source or a blank node. Each statement can be represented as a triple of the
format <Subject, Predicate, Object>; for example, <Ben, loves, Sara> or <Sara,
has Birthday, “27.11.1991”>. The description of RDF can be viewed as a directed
labelled graph, where each RDF triple defines the edge directed from the subject
to the object, which is labelled with the predicate (property). The nodes of the
graph can be URI, blank node (auxiliary nodes), or XML literal value. Literal
values are not used in a subject position; in other words, they cannot be the start
of an edge in the graph. Figure 2.8 shows an example of an RDF graph.
2.6 A Query Framework for RDF
This section will provide a survey, recently conducted by the W3C, of popular
RDF query languages.
SPARQL [Prud’hommeaux and Seaborne, 2006] is a query language for RDF data
sources. The SPARQL query language is similar to SQL. It is specified by the RDF
Data Access Working Group of W3C. It has different characteristic compared to
SQL in the following aspects:
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Figure 2.8: Data representation of RDF graph
- SPARQL does not have specific Data Definition Language (DDL) provisions,
due to the semantic schemas being represented in both RDFS and OWL as
standard RDF graphs; therefore, it requires no specific language to deal with
them.
- SPARQL is not a Data Modification Language (DML) design, which means
that RDF graphs cannot be inserted, deleted, and updated using SPARQL.
The fundamental reason for this is that there is still no consensus regarding
the design of an optimal DML for RDF.
Four types of queries are supported by SPARQL:
- SELECT queries return n-tuples of results just like the SELECT queries in
SQL.
- DESCRIBE queries return an RDF graph so that the resulting graph de-
scribes the resources which match the query constraints.
- ASK queries provide positive or negative answer which indicates whether or
not the query pattern can be satisfied.
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- CONSTRUCT queries return an RDF graph which is built by substituting
the variables in the graph template and combining the triples into a single
RDF graph by set union. Examples of the four types of queries that are
supported by SPARQL are shown below.
PREFIX abc: <http://example.com/exampleOntology#>
SELECT ?name
WHERE { ?x abc:name ?name . }
PREFIX abc: <http://example.com/exampleOntology#>
DESCRIBE ?x
WHERE { ?x abc:mbox <mailto:alice@org> }
PREFIX abc: <http://example.com/exampleOntology#>
ASK { ?x abc:name "Alice" }
PREFIX abc: <http://example.com/exampleOntology#>
PREFIX vcard: <http://www.w3.org/2001/vcard-rdf/3.0#>
CONSTRUCT { <http://example.org/person#Alice> vcard:FN ?name }
WHERE { ?x foaf:name ?name }
SquishQL [Miller et al., 2002] is a triples-based query language for accessing RDF
data. The query syntax used is designed to reflect the RDF’s graph syntax, and
uses SQL-like constructs.
RDQL [Haase et al., 2004] was developed by Hewlett Packard and submitted
to the W3C in January 2004. It has been employed in several semantic RDF
systems such as Jena, RDFStore, Sesame and 3Store. RDQL was derived mainly
from SquishQL RDF query language, which itself is derived from rdfDB. RDQL
Chapter 2. Background 31
is similar to SQL-like syntax which supports the different clauses of select, from,
where, and using (with some exceptions) as SquishQL.
SeRQL [Broekstra and Kampman, 2004] is based on several earlier languages such
as RDQL with more SQL-like functions. SeRQL supports many of the basic RDF-
query features such as path expressions, Boolean constraints and advanced features
such as optional matching.
The interactive Tucana Query Language (iTQL) [Wood et al., 2005] is an RDF
query language based on SQL and the Squish family. iTQL provides richer features
such as allowing some flexibility not present in RDQL, for example, result set size
limits.
2.7 Linked Data
This section offers a short introduction to the main principles of linked data ac-
cording to the particular requirements of semantic repositories as determined by
Tim Berners-Lee [Lee et al., 2001]. Linked data is a technique for sharing, ex-
posing and connecting data, information and facts on the Semantic Web utilizing
both URIs and RDF [Kiryakov and Damova, 2011; Lassila et al., 2000]. Linked
data include publishing as well as interlinking open data sources. Four principles
are followed, namely:
1. URIs are used as names for things.
2. HTTP URIs are used so that people can look up those names.
3. Useful information is provided when someone looks up a URI.
4. Links to other URIs help people to explore more things.
Actually, the majority of the RDF datasets satisfy principles 1, 2, and 4 by design.
The novel approach of these design principles address the need to allow Semantic
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Web browsers to load HTTP descriptions of RDF resources based on their URIs.
For this, data publishers must ensure that:
• The “physical” addresses of the published data are the same as the “logical”
addresses, using RDF URI references.
• When receiving an HTTP request, the server should return an RDF-molecule
( i.e the set of triples that describe the resource).
Linking Open Data [W3C, 2007] is a W3C Semantic Web Education and Outreach
(SWEO) community project intended to extend the Web by creating open datasets
as RDF and establishing RDF links between data items from different data sources.
The central dataset of the Linking Open Data is DBPedia, an RDF extract of the
Wikipedia open encyclopedia, Figure 2.9.
The linked data facilitates the realization of the Semantic Web as a global Web
of structured data resulting from the Linking Open Data initiative. However,
querying and reasoning with linked data brings about various challenges associated
with the very scale and nature of such data. In general, the management as well as
the publishing of linked data generates scenarios of usage for semantic repositories
that bring a variety of particular needs, such as:
- Dealing with a massive number of different predicates, for example, hundreds
of thousands of predicates in DBPedia.
- Optimizations in the reasoning.
- Novel query representation methods need to be developed because the stan-
dard structured query languages and engine assume the schema knowledge
at the time of query specification.
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2.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided the historical context and the architecture of Semantic Web
technology, and discussed description logics in the Semantic Web. It described a
number of ontology languages that have been developed for the representation of
ontologies on the Web. It also introduced the semantic repositories and discussed
their links to several other technology trends, including relational databases. It
also provided a survey of popular RDF query languages, and discussed the main
principles of linked data that create particular needs for semantic repositories.
CHAPTER 3
Literature Review
Chapter Plan:
3.1 Related Semantic Technology Stores (36)
3.2 Access Control Paradigms (43)
3.3 Positive and Negative Authorization (47)
3.4 Security Views in Semantic Technology (48)
At this point, the most prominent semantic repositories can be discussed. Also, the
semantic repository engines are summarized with supported storage and supported
query languages in Table 3.1.
A review of technologies related to access control models is also given.
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3.1 Related Semantic Technology Stores
Along with popular research on the Semantic Web, semantic repositories have
been developed using several different approaches for storing semantic data. In
general, semantic repositories (triple stores) can be broadly classified under four
categories/types, based on the consistent strategy they use: In-memory triple-
stores, Native triplestores, RDBMS-backed triplestores and NoSQL triplestores
[Baolin and Bo, 2005; Stegmaier et al., December 2009].
• In-memory triplestores store the RDF graph in main memory.
• Native-disk triplestores are those that are implemented from scratch and
exploit the RDF data model to efficiently store and access the RDF data.
• RDBMS-backed triplestores are built by adding an RDF specific layer to an
existing RDBMS.
• NoSQL Triplestores refer to the concept of a non-relational database which
suggests NoSQL database management framework to manage RDF data.
In-memory triplestores have limits based on the amount of memory available.
Storing everything in-memory cannot be a serious method for storing extremely
large volumes of data. The alternative is to use a native triple store providing
persistent disk based storage of triples. Native disk storage might be useful for
storing semantic data because of easy deployment and the simplicity of storing in
a unique file. But this approach requires the manual management of semantic files
and is therefore not suitable to efficiently store, load, and request a large amount of
semantic data; it can have management and performance issues. Another approach
is to use databases to store the ontologies (such as a relational database or object-
oriented database). In particular, most semantic storage systems are based on
a relational database, because it is widely used for data management and has
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been made stable through improvement over several decades [Chen et al., 2006;
Harrison and Chan, 2005]. The alternative to traditional relational databases,
NoSQL Triplestores have recently been investigated as possible storage managers
for RDF.
Several of today’s semantic repositories are available as both open-source projects
and proprietary solutions; some well-known ones are presented below in alphabet-
ical order together with a discussion of their specific advantages and features.
3Store Family
Garlik, a company dealing with online identity and personal information protec-
tion in the UK, developed a family of RDF triple stores named 3store, 4store, and
5store. 3store is an RDF “triple store”, written in C and backed by MySQL and
Berkeley database. 4store (http://www.4store.org) is an open-source database
storage and query engine that holds RDF data designed to run in a cluster set-
up of up to 32 nodes. 4store designs a distribution schema derived from data
partitioning [Harris et al., 2009]. While 4store itself does not provide infer-
ence capabilities, [Salvadores et al., 2010] proposed the 4s-reasoner, which im-
plements RDF reasoning through backward-chaining on top of 4store. 5store
(http://4store.org/trac/wiki/5store) has the same functionality and interfaces as
4store, but offers a new architecture which allows the handling of larger clusters
and gives better performance.
AllegroGraph
AllegroGraph RDFStore [Franz, 2010] was developed to meet W3C standards for
RDF, so it is appropriately considered as an RDF Database with support for
SPARQL, RDFS++, and Prolog reasoning from Java applications. It uses memory
utilization in combination with disk-based storage to scale to RDF triples.
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ARC
ARC was developed as an RDF system for the Semantic Web and PHP practi-
tioners. It is open-source and runs in most Web server environments (it is PHP
5.3 compliant), (http://arc.semsol.org).
BigData
BigData (http://www.systap.com/bigdata.htm) is a horizontally-scaled, open-source
distributed B+ Tree database, designed to accommodate RDF repositories on com-
modity hardware. It was designed as a distributed database architecture.
BigOWLIM
BigOWLIM (http://www.ontotext.com/owlim/big/-index.html) is the semantic
repository created by Ontotext. It is implemented in Java and is used as a Storage
and Inference Layer (SAIL) backend repository for the Sesame RDF framework to
obtain OWL reasoning capability.
Boca Server
Boca RDF server is an open-source RDF triple store which is the cornerstone
component of the IBM Semantic Layered Research Platform [Feigenbaum et al.,
2007]. The aim is to provide a full application framework based on Semantic RDF
Store. IBM Boca Application, constructed on Semantic Web data, ontology and
query standards, can merge disparate data from multiple sources and make the
data freely available for consumption by other applications.
CumulusRDF
CumulusRDF is an RDF store which provides triple pattern lookups, a linked data
server and proxy capabilities, bulk loading, and querying via SPARQL. The storage
back-end of CumulusRDF is Apache Cassandra, a NoSQL database management
system [Ladwig and Harth, 2011].
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DAML DB
DAML DB was extended by BBN Technologies, which currently appears as part of
Parliament (http://www.bbn.com/technology/knowledge/parliament) [Kolas et al.,
2009]. Parliament is a prototype implementation of a knowledge base manage-
ment system that includes a high-performance storage engine, compatible with
the RDF and OWL standards. Parliament is usually paired with query processing
frameworks such as Sesame or Jena for implementing a complete knowledge base
management solution with support for SPARQL query language.
Inkling
Inkling is developed as a Java implementation of the SquishQL RDF query lan-
guage. It uses PostgreSQL to store the triples persistently and can access it via
Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) and maps the query language into Post-
greSQL [Miller, 2001].
Jena
Jena [McBride, 2002; Wilkinson et al., 2003] is one of the most popular semantic
repositories that provides a programmatic environment for RDF or OWL and offers
methods for loading RDF data into a memory-based triple store, a native storage
or into a persistent triple store. Jena supports both SPARQL1 and RDQL2 query
languages to access RDF or OWL data. Figure 3.1 illustrates the architecture of
the Jena framework. Jena SDB is a component of Jena which provides for scalable
storage and query of RDF data. An SDB persistence layer can be accessed and
managed with the provided command line scripts and via the Jena API. SDB can
be coupled with the RDF-server ‘Joseki’ - which is a SPARQL query server that
allows an SDB store to be queried over an HTTP interface. Jena also introduced
a non-transactional native store called TDB.
1http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-sparql-query/
2http://www.w3.org/Submission/RDQL/
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Figure 3.1: The architecture of Jena framework
Kowari Metastore
Kowari is an Open Source database for the storage, retrieval and analysis of RDF
metadata. Kowari is written in Java and clients can connect to the database via
Java using either JRDF or Kowari’s Java-based RDF API library. Kowari’s RDF
repository is based on the a transactional triple store known as XA-Triplestore
engine which provides native RDF support and enables the deployment of multiple
databases per Kowari server instance [Wood et al., 2005].
Mulgara Store
Mulgara store is an RDF database written entirely in Java. It is an Open Source
fork of the Kowari metastore. Instances in the Mulgara store can be queried via
the iTQL query language and the SPARQL query language [Gearon and Muys,
2009].
Oracle
Oracle brought RDF support as part of the Spatial option of its DBMS since
version 10 g R2 [Murray, 2012]. This support has improved in several ways and
includes support for the OWL Prime dialect, which is comparable with the owl-
max semantics; and the efficiency of RDF loading and inference is considerably
improved.
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Redland
Redland was written in C and provides support for the RDF in the form of an
RDF API and triple stores. It supports querying with SPARQL and RDQL using
the Rasqal RDF Query Library (“is a free software / Open Source C library that
handles RDF query language syntaxes, query construction and execution of queries
returning results as bindings, boolean, RDF graphs/triples or syntaxes”)3.
RDFDB
RDFDB is an open-source database for RDF for systems like Semantic Web Ser-
vices. It supports an SQL-like query language (SquishQL/RDQL) [Guha, 2001].
Sesame
Sesame supports RDF and all the major syntaxes and query languages related to it
[Aduna, 2008]. Sesame is an open source RDF database that provides storage and
querying facilities for RDF Schema and OWL [Aduna, 2008]. It can be deployed
as a Web server or used as a Java library. Supported features include several
query languages (e.g. SeRQL and SPARQL), RDF Schema inference engine and
memory, native disk or relational database storage. Several engines rely on the
Sesame RDF database framework (http://www.openrdf.org).
Stardog
Stardog is a commercial RDF triplestore [Cerans et al., 2012]. Supported fea-
tures include query language SPARQL, full-text indexing and search, and stored
procedures.
Virtuoso
OpenLink Virtuoso (http://www.openlinksw.com/virtuoso/) is a “cross-platform
server” offering diverse data and metadata management facilities such as XML
management, RDBMS integration and full-text indexing [Erling and Mikhailov,
3http://librdf.org/
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2007]. The core engine of Virtuoso provides persistent storage to manage an
OWL knowledge base in a relational database engine with numerous RDF-oriented
adaptations in datatypes, index layout, and query optimization.
YARS2
YARS2 (Yet Another RDF Store, Version 2) is a distributed system for managing
and querying large amounts of graph-structured data. RDF data and SPARQL
are supported [Harth et al., 2007].
Name Programming
Language
Supported storage Supported Query
language
Inference Capa-
bilities
3Store C MySQL, Berkley DB SPARQL, RDQL No
AllegroGraph Lisp Native disk storage SPARQL RDFS
ARC PHP MySQL SPARQL via plugins
Bigdata Java Distributed databases SPARQL RDFS, OWL (Lim-
ited)
BigOWLIM Java (plug-in of Sesame) SPARQL Rules
Boca Java Relational databases SPARQL -
CumulusRDF Java NOSQL databases SPARQL -
DAML DB C++ Relational databases SPARQL -
Inkling Java Relational databases SquishQL -
Jena Java Relational databases SPARQL, RDQL RDFS, OWL, Cus-
tom Reasoner
Kowari Java Memory, Native storage,
Relational backends
SPARQL, RDQL,
iTQL
Rules
Mulgara
Store
Java Integrated database SPARQL, iTQL -
Oracle Java Relational databases SPARQL, SQL RDFS, OWL
Redland C Relational databases SPARQL, RDQL No
rdfDB Perl Berkeley DB SquishQL, RDQL -
Sesame Java Memory, Native storage,
Relational database
SPARQL, SeRQL RDFS, Custom rea-
soner
Stardog Java Native disk storage SPARQL -
Virtuoso Java Relational databases SPARQL RDFS, OWL (Lim-
ited)
YARS2 Java Berkeley DB SPARQL External OWL
Reasoner
Table 3.1: Overview of some available Semantic Repositories
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Lack of scalability is one of the most significant problems faced by single machine
RDF data stores. There has been a significant amount of research done to improve
the design and implementation of solutions for the efficient storage and retrieval of
RDF data on single machines [Hertel et al., 2009; Khadilkar et al., 2012; Melnik,
2000; Wilkinson, 2006].
Several of today’s semantic storage systems support a monolithic schema with a
single storage layer that stores all statements. These systems store semantic data
as sets of RDF triples or do not include hierarchical knowledge among concepts
and properties; hence, they do not comply with the complex data model of on-
tology expressions [Baolin and Bo, 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Harrison and Chan,
2005; Stegmaier et al., December 2009]. This also indicates that some issues, such
as reduced system performance, can be expected and observed due to the large
amount of data managed in a single storage model.
3.2 Access Control Paradigms
Access Control provides a means of restricting access to objects based on the
identity of subjects and/or groups that attempt to access those objects. Three
common names are associated with traditional access control models. These are :
Discretionary Access Control, Mandatory Access Control and Role-Based Access
Control.
In Discretionary Access Control (DAC) systems, the permissions to access an
object are defined and modified by its owner. The DAC model assumes that
every object has an owner who controls the permissions to access the object and
usually only the owner can destroy that object. In some implementations, the
owner is able to grant privileges to other users to delegate permissions further
[Benantar, 2005]. DAC is typically used in most desktop operating systems. In
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Mandatory Access Control (MAC), rights are assigned by a central authority.
MAC is historically associated with hierarchical /multi-level security. Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) systems remove the explicit use of subjects and replace
them with roles which form a logical group of a number of subjects. In fact,
permissions are assigned to roles and the subjects are assigned members of a
number of roles. The following sections go into more detail about multi-level
access control and RBAC.
3.2.1 Multi-level Access Control
In multi-level access control, a security classification is attached to each object.
The security classification has two pieces of information: sensitivity (e.g. top
secret, secret, confidential, unclassified) and security clearance. Also, each subject
in the system possesses a clearance. In order to determine whether a subject is
allowed to access an object, the subject’s clearance is compared to the object’s
classification [Benantar, 2005; Sandhu and Samarati, 1994].
Multi-level security is based on the concept of dominance. This means that a
subject on a security level dominates (has access to) all objects that are on the
same or lower level, and an object assigned to a certain security level can be
accessed only by subjects at the same or higher level. This policy was originally
implemented for military organizations where security levels are closely related to
military ranks [Benantar, 2005]. Figure 3.2 shows an example of hierarchical user
access.
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Figure 3.2: Hierarchical User Access
3.2.2 Role-based Access Control
RBAC is a model for security administration for large computing environments.
RBAC conforms closely to the organizational model utilized in corporations. Cor-
porations normally have a structure in which administrative rights match the po-
sition. RBAC meets this requirement by separating the concepts of Users, Roles
and Permissions. Roles are defined in a system, then access rights are assigned
to roles, and roles are further assigned to users. The RBAC model’s features
described by Sandu et al. [Sandhu et al., 1996], are summarized in Table 3.2.
To explore RBAC’s various dimensions. a family of reference models has served as
the basis for ongoing standardization efforts. This family consists of four models
that are related to each other as shown in Table 3.2. RBAC0 contains the minimum
functionality for an RBAC system. RBAC1 includes the RBAC0 functionality and
adds role hierarchies which provide a means of reflecting the hierarchical structure
of roles in an organization; that is, one role can inherit permissions from another
role. RBAC2 includes RBAC0 and adds constraints which impose restrictions on
the way that the components of a RBAC system may be configured. A constraint
is a defined relationship among roles or a condition related to roles. RBAC3
contains the functionality of RBAC0, RBAC1, and RBAC2.
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Roles can inherit the characteristics of other roles and form a role hierarchy, i.e.
a partial order that defines a seniority relation between roles, where one of the
roles is a junior role and the other one is a senior role. A senior role acquires the
permissions of its juniors, including all recursive permissions, as the relation is
transitive. Figure 3.3 shows an example of a role hierarchy. In addition, various
kinds of constraints can be specified in RBAC. These include separation of duty
constraints, prerequisite constraints, and cardinality constraints. Separation of
duty relations are used to enforce ‘conflict of interest’ policies. Conflict of interest
in a role-based system may arise as a result of a user gaining authorization for
permissions associated with conflicting roles. One means of preventing this type
of conflict of interest is by static separation of duty, that is, enforcing constraints
on the assignment of users to roles: membership in one role may prevent the user
from being a member of one or more other roles. Prerequisite constraints allow
a user to be assigned to a role only if the user is already assigned to the role’s
prerequisites. Cardinality constraints can be used to restrict, for example, the
number of users that can be assigned to a role, the number of roles a user can
assume, the number of roles a permission can be assigned to, or the number of
sessions a user is allowed to activate at the same time.
RBAC has been presented as a policy-neutral model. It means that RBAC model
can be applied for both discretionary [Sandhu and Munawer, 1998] and mandatory
policies [Osborn et al., 2000].
Model Name Features
RBAC0 Basic RBAC Users, Roles, Permissions, and Sessions
RBAC1 Hierarchical RBAC Adds Role Hierarchy to RBAC0
RBAC2 Constrained RBAC Adds Constraints to RBAC0
RBAC3 Consolidated RBAC Combines RBAC1 and RBAC2
Table 3.2: The features included in RBAC models
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Figure 3.3: An example of a role hierarchy
3.3 Positive and Negative Authorization
Authorization models supporting positive and negative authorization have a sign
field in permission tuple, for example, ≺subject; sign; access right; object .
The sign denotes either a permission (positive rule) or a prohibition (negative
rule), and determines the effect of the access right. Positive authorizations state
those accesses that are to be allowed; negative authorizations state accesses to be
denied. Traditionally, positive and negative authorizations have corresponded to
two classical approaches to access control, namely:
- An Open policy specifies denial of access if there exists an explicit negative
authorization for it, and allows it otherwise.
- The opposite, a closed policy, allows an access if there exists an explicit
positive authorization for it, and denies it otherwise [Al-Kahtani and Sandhu,
2004].
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3.3.1 Authorization Resolution Policies
Conflict resolution policies have been discussed extensively in the literature, see
for example, [Al-Kahtani and Sandhu, 2004; Bertino et al., 1997, 1999; Jajodia
et al., 1997]. In rule-based systems, the simplest solution is that the first rule
encountered applies, be it granting or denying access. Other conflict resolution
methods choose one of the rules in conflict to take precedence over the others.
Most notable among them are:
Denial Takes Precedence (DTP) is a conflict resolution-policy stating that in the
case where multiple permissions granting access to a resource are conflicting, de-
nied permission will take precedence.
Positive Takes Precedence (PTP) is a policy stating that if conflicting permissions
arise, any allowing permission will take precedence.
Permissions Resolve Policy Resolution
≺Alice; +; Read; ProjectX
≺Alice; -; Read; ProjectX
Positive Takes Precedence Allow
≺Alice; +; Read; ProjectX
≺Alice; -; Read; ProjectX
Negative Takes Precedence Deny
Table 3.3: An example of conflict resolution
3.4 Security Views in Semantic Technology
Essentially, semantic repository is utilized to refer to a system for storage, query-
ing, and management of structured data with respect to ontologies. Three partly
overlapping groups of repository tools can be recognized. (i) Semantic repositories
expand the functionality of ordinary repositories to envelop semantic descriptions,
for instance, to store statements in regard to objects. (ii) A reasoner is utilized
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to produce logical results from a given sequence of facts or axioms. (iii) Semantic
middleware platforms integrate heterogeneous data sources and build a unique
interface for mission-critical information.
3.4.1 Semantic Information Security in Existing Reposito-
ries and Reasoners
At present, a number of semantic repositories are accessible as both proprietary
solutions as well as open source projects such as Sesame, YARS2, Jena, and Alle-
groGraph. In all of these applications, the semantic model stores the data of the
domain or serves as a mediator to the data sources. Protection of the semantic
model becomes as vital as the protection of the data itself. Sesame is a widely-
utilized RDF triple store that is optimized for requests and storage [Aduna, 2008].
Access rights are offered for each repository. YARS2 is a distributed system for
managing large amounts of graph-structured data. It focuses on new indexing
strategies [Harth et al., 2007]. However, its documentation lacks, for example,
information regarding access rights. AllegroGraph offers support for metadata
management [Franz, 2010], but information regarding access rights could not be
found. Jena was originally developed inside the labs at HP’s Semantic Web Pro-
gramme [McBride, 2002]. Access rights are not supplied, and the same applies
to OWLIM [Bishop et al., 2011]. Mulgara [Gearon and Muys, 2009] is optimized
for the purpose of managing metadata; however, it does not offer access rights.
FaCT++ [Tsarkov and Horrocks, 2006] is a Description Logic reasoner founded
on tableaux decisions. There is scant documentation, and no information regard-
ing access rights or metadata. Neither Pellet [Sirin et al., 2007] nor RacerPro
[Haarslev et al., 2007] supports access rights in terms of reasoning.
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The Oracle RDF contains sub-programs that provide fine-grained access control
to RDF data, using either a virtual private database (VPD) or Oracle Label Se-
curity (OLS) [Murray, 2012]. While these techniques allow very flexible policies,
the authoring of policies involves writing complicated procedure programs that en-
force access restrictions to a user query. It is also considered a highly error-prone
process as it is difficult to verify whether the policies are implemented correctly.
Therefore, a mechanism is required to automatically translate middle-tier policies
into physical repository policies.
3.4.2 Related Paradigms and Technologies
Research has been conducted on numerous security aspects of semantic technolo-
gies, consisting of authorization regarding semantic models. Dietzold and Auer
[Dietzold and Auer, 2006] discussed the necessary entities for an access control
model which targets an RDF triple store, and developed a very basic model. It is
based on the utilization of filters that select the triples that a user can access ac-
cording to his/her credentials; the original request is then executed on the filtered
triples.
Semantic access control was integrated with a mediator which is a software layer
offering a uniform interface to a set of heterogeneous data sources [Mitra et al.,
2006; Pan et al., 2006]. An ontology is utilized to map the database schemas which
need to interoperate, while a table records the communication amongst the roles of
the various databases (role-based access control is assumed). Utilizing this table,
the system ascertains whether a user should be given access to particular objects
in a specified database, depending on the user’s query.
Qin and Atluri [Qin and Atluri, 2003] proposed a control model consisting of
concept-level access which supports propagation based on the relationships amongst
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concepts for the purpose of regulating the access to data by individuals. A pol-
icy language based on constraint logic programming principles was adopted by
Kaushik et al. [Kaushik et al., 2005]. This language is utilized to define a frame-
work for controlling the disclosure of sensitive portions of an ontology, and for
selectively hiding names of concepts and/or relationships and replacing them with
desensitized names. Qu et al. [Qu et al., 2004] presented an ontology-based rights
expression language built on top of OWL to express access rights to resources.
Kagal et al. [Kagal et al., 2003] proposed policy languages called Rei based on
Semantic Web languages like RDF and DAML+OIL and developed a framework,
Rein, based on Rei. Finin et al. [Finin et al., 2008] proposed the use of the OWL
language as the formalization of the RBAC model. They provide two ways to
formalize an RBAC role, as a class or as an attribute.
Another method, proposed by Chen and Stuckenschmidt [Chen and Stucken-
schmidt, 2010], enforces access restrictions by means of query rewriting. This
approach is proposed as a suitable way of enforcing access restrictions in the con-
text of SPARQL queries, while the TBox is assumed to be completely public. Sim-
ilar approaches also make it possible to hide TBox parts [Li and Cheung, 2008],
or to define the permissions for a query. The idea is to automatically add filter
conditions to the query to suppress those answers that the user is not supposed
to see [Chen and Stuckenschmidt, 2010; Li and Cheung, 2008]. Given a Query Q
and a set of access restrictions {AR1. . . ARn} that apply to the current user, the
query can be rewritten to a new query that is defined as:
Q ∧ ¬AR1 ∧ . . . . ∧ ¬ ARn
This way of rewriting the query based on the access restrictions of the individual
users effectively prevents the system from giving away restricted knowledge. In
particular, using query rewriting, the effective answer to a query is:
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µ(Q)  µ(Q ∧ ¬AR1 ∧ . . . . ∧ ¬ ARn)
However, it comes with a problem: it hides more knowledge than necessary [Knech-
tel and Stuckenschmidt, 2010]. Also, the TBox is not assumed to be completely
public because an access control policy for an ontology should consider the propa-
gation based on the semantic relationship among concepts (TBox family). Security
concerns over ontologies can be violated if access control to concepts is considered
separately outside of the concepts’ relationship.
Papakonstantinou et al. [Papakonstantinou et al., 2012] proposed access control
authorizations that are used to assign an abstract access control token to RDF
triples as specified by means of a query. The method focuses on the RDF triple
level, as the syntax process is not sufficient because the remainder of the RDF
triples alone may not make sense. Knechtel and Stuckenschmidt [Knechtel and
Stuckenschmidt, 2010] enforce access restrictions by means of axiom filtering that
relies on axiom labelling. The idea is to label each axiom with a certain access
restriction. However, to fully support content-based access control, authorization
requirements should be established not only for the model’s concepts axioms, but
also for their individuals. Also, this naive syntactic process is inadequate since the
remaining axioms might not make sense alone.
Also, there has been remarkable progress in recent years regarding access control to
XML data structures [Bertino et al., 2002; Duong and Zhang, 2007; Fan et al., 2004,
2006]. For example, Fan et al. [Fan et al., 2004] proposed a novel query rewriting
and optimization algorithms for a significant fragment of XPath. However, the
major basic difference between XML and RDF is that XML is concerned with
data structure, whereas RDF/OWL is concerned with information content (i.e.
data model).
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The aforementioned systems suggest diverse approaches for dealing with the pro-
tection of the ontology problem; however, they deal with the protection of the
ontology’s access concept problem without taking into consideration the autho-
rization decisions according to the content of the data that needs to be accessed,
i.e. ABox facts in the domain knowledge [Knechtel and Stuckenschmidt, 2010; Qin
and Atluri, 2003]. Some of these techniques have assumed the TBox level to be
completely public and considered separately outside of the concepts’ relationship
[Chen and Stuckenschmidt, 2010; Li and Cheung, 2008] or concentrated on triples
rather than TBox resources [Papakonstantinou et al., 2012]. Other approaches
provided a highly error-prone process with complex mechanisms in order to secure
an ontology knowledge base [Murray, 2012].
Considering the various sensitivities of semantic data in both TBox and ABox
paradigms, suitable access control mechanisms pertaining to the semantic reposi-
tory should be put in place in order to provide a fully content-based authorization
system and combine flexibility as well as a powerful core policy enforcement sys-
tem, thereby making the process less costly.
In this thesis, a multi-layered authorization control model is proposed which is a
combination of ‘security role & labelling technique’ in which many security prop-
erties can be determined by the expressiveness of the authorization scheme, the
powerful authorization system [Sandhu, 1994] and the multi-clearance paradigm
[Xu et al., 2009]. It also effectively takes advantage of a role-based model that
is commonly considered a mature, flexible technology that facilitates administra-
tion [Sandhu, 1994]. From a functional perspective, providing a solution to the
problem of securing the ontology knowledge base at both levels would enhance the
usefulness and the potential impact of semantic technologies in practice.
In order to design semantic authorization control for secure semantic data repos-
itories, several research questions have been raised from Section 1.2. All these
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research questions should be addressed using a variety of methodologies in order
to make the model more effective and flexible. This will be discussed in more
detail in next chapters.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the most prominent semantic technology stores. It also in-
troduced a review of technologies related to access control models. Three common
names associated with traditional access control models were mentioned: MAC,
DAC and RBAC. Finally, the chapter examined and discussed the strengths and
weaknesses of several current semantic data access control mechanisms.
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A growing number of domains are adopting semantic models as a centralized gate-
way in order to achieve semantic interoperability among data sources and appli-
cations, or directly for modelling and managing relevant information. Most of the
Semantic Web applications developed for such an environment require the man-
agement of large amounts of semantic data which are stored in semantic models;
therefore, the efficient management of semantic models is a critical factor affecting
the performance of many applications. This requirement has motivated the design
of specialized repositories in order to store and manipulate semantic models. As
described in Section 2.4, a semantic repository is a system that has at least two
features: (i) it offers a triple store facility for RDF data sources, since ontologies
are often expressed in RDF; and (ii) it provides an infrastructure for the seman-
tic inference engine to derive answers from the data source for both explicit and
implicitly-derived information.
Semantic repositories are capable of handling structured data, taking into consid-
eration their semantics. The benefits and the distinctive applications of semantic
repositories are presented, focusing on two usage scenarios: reasoning with and the
management of semantic data, and enterprise data integration. They also com-
bine the essential features of other different types of tools: reasoning capabilities,
like those of the inference engines; capabilities to handle sparse data and evolving
data schemas like those of the column-stores; and the robustness of the relational
DBMS. After several years of development, semantic repositories are now being
adopted and are attracting attention in real-world applications, which can be at-
tributed to two reasons: the tools have reached a certain threshold of maturity,
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and the market has finally come to understand and appreciate their unique value
proposition.
To enforce semantic authorizations in semantic knowledge bases, first the seman-
tic storage system is examined. Most of the semantic storage systems support a
monolithic schema with a single storage layer that stores all statements. These
systems store semantic data as sets of RDF triples or do not include hierarchical
knowledge among concepts and properties; hence, they do not comply with the
complex data model of ontology expressions [Baolin and Bo, 2005; Chen et al.,
2006; Harrison and Chan, 2005; Stegmaier et al., December 2009]. This also indi-
cates that some issues, such as reduced system performance, can be expected and
observed due to the large amount of data managed in a single storage model. For
this aspect, a novel modification of a semantic storage model is proposed in this
chapter so that storage optimization can be achieved and the policy based access
control architecture can be enhanced for safeguarding semantic data repositories.
This chapter tackles this particular problem by answering the following research
questions.
1- How can the semantic authorization model be affected by the design of a
semantic storage system?
2- How can a semantic knowledge base be efficiently managed and stored in a
persistent semantic storage repository?
3- What are the key benefits of and reasons for defining a new semantic layout
to store a semantic knowledge base?
Data representation in a triple store, though flexible, suffers from an issue such
as performance that arises in knowledge representation since there is only a single
table that store all statements. In this thesis, an efficient semantic storage layout is
proposed to store a semantic knowledge base. Figure 4.1 shows an overview of the
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proposed model layers (more details in Section 4.3). Hence, the contributions of
the research work documented in this chapter are as follows:
• Building semantic data storage layout for semantic systems that provide opti-
mization in terms of query time performance and storage.
• Building a semantic store with a richer structure than previous approaches
based on semantic description logic (DL) knowledge representation.
Schema
Lookup
Data
Inference
Proposed Model layers
Semantic storage Layer
Triple Store
Figure 4.1: The proposed model supports four layers
4.1 Semantic Knowledge Representation
Semantic DL knowledge representation has been chosen as the formal framework
for this work because of its favorable complexity results and inference capabilities.
The Semantic Web community implicitly adopted DL as a core technology for the
ontology layer. One of the reasons behind this is that this logic has been heavily
analyzed in order to understand how constructors interact and combine to affect
tractable reasoning [Lassila et al., 2000]. Thus, description logics are useful and
efficient for knowledge representation and reasoning about structured knowledge,
fitting into the structural provision of RDF, RDF schema and OWL technologies.
Typically, semantic DL knowledge base is comprised of two parts.
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• The terminological part that describes conceptualization, i.e. a set of concepts
and properties for these concepts, and captures the concept hierarchies (i.e.
relations between concepts),
• The assertional part that captures the facts in an application domain [Milea
et al., 2012; Turhan, 2011].
The semantics of DL is defined by interpretations. Every interpretation is a pair
(D, I), where D is a non-empty set of individual objects called the ‘domain’, and
I is an interpretation function. The interpretation function is a mapping from
individual, concept and property names to elements of the domain, subsets of the
domain and binary relations on the domain, so that:
- every concept (class) C is a subset of D,
- every property P is a binary relation on D × D,
- every individual x is an element of D, x ∈ D.
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Figure 4.2: An example of OWL DL Ontology which contains concepts and
individuals, and the relations between concepts and individuals
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For example, in OWL, concepts are explained as sets of objects that represent
the individuals in the domain of discourse. A property, that is a binary rela-
tion connecting concepts, can be further distinguished as an object property or
data property. An object property represents the relation between individuals
(instances) of two concepts, whereas a data type property represents the relation
between an individual concept and the literal value. In this thesis, classes are
described as concepts, while instances of a class are described as individuals. For
example, as shown in Figure 4.2, we have concepts (such as Organization, Country,
Person), properties (such as HasBranchOffice, HasHeadOffice, HasEmployee), and
individuals (such as WS, Smith, Bob, India, USA). In the following, we clarify the
components of DL knowledge bases.
Definition 1 (Concept Hierarchy). Let H = {H1, . . . , Hn} be a finite set
of concept hierarchies. Each concept hierarchy Hi is a set of concepts partially
ordered by the subsumption relation: Hi = (Ci, v) where Ci is a subset of C , the
set of all concepts, and v is the subsumption relation which is used to create a
hierarchy of concepts.
Figure 4.3: An example of inheritance relation
For example, Figure 4.3, (Ci2 v Ci1) means that Ci1 subsumes a concept Ci2 in
the concept hierarchy.
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Definition 2 (TBox T ). Terminological axioms are represented by a collection
of definitions of concepts and their properties (relations), and may contain sub-
sumption relations between concepts (concept hierarchy).
Definition 3 (ABox A). Given a set C of concepts and a set P of relations in
an ontology , and a set O of individual objects, the assertional knowledge base in
the ontology is represented by :
- C(x) where C ∈ C and x ∈ O.
- P(x; y) where P ∈ P and x; y ∈ O.
Definition 4. A DL knowledge base (KB) is an ordered pair (T , A) where
• T is a set of terminological axioms (the TBox).
• A is a set of assertional axioms (the ABox).
As a brief conceptual description of the definitions above, the TBox stores concepts
and their relations (like an ontology), and the ABox stores sentences constructed
using these concepts. In other words, ABox contains assertions about individuals
in relationship with the terminology. It contains two kinds of assertions: concept
assertions and relation assertions. Concept assertions state the relations between
individuals and concepts. Relation assertions state the relations between named
individuals.
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4.2 Semantic Triple Store Representation
Semantic Web data is usually defined as a set of specific resources, each provided
with a pair (property, value). These semantic data are usually called triples or
statements and represent the data stored in semantic repositories. This is based
on the RDF model consisting of triples of the form (s,p,o) where s, p and o
are respectively called the subject, property and object of the triple which build
statements of knowledge [Candan et al., 2001; Lassila and Swick, 1999].
Triple. A triple is typically interpreted as a statement where “object o stands
in relationship p with subject s”. The signature of an RDF triple is defined as
(s,p,o) ∈ (U ∪ B) × U × (U ∪ B ∪ L) where U, B and L are possibly infinite
sets of URI resources identifying nodes, blank nodes and RDF literals respectively
[Bechhofer, 2002; Beckett, 2004; Lassila and Swick, 1999; Pulido et al., 2006; Zeng
et al., 2013].
Triple store. The semantic knowledge base is managed by a triple store, which
is also called a semantic repository. These stores include a triple table where an
RDF triple would persist as a database row of the form (s,p,o). Each triple states
the relation between subject and object, as shown in Figure 4.4.
For example, semantic ABox knowledge is represented as triples where s is always
an individual; o can be either an individual or a literal; and p can be either an
object property or a data type property. TBox knowledge also adheres to the
triple (s,p,o) format, while here s is the concept or property, p is the predefined
predicates describing the attribute of this concept or property, and o is the value
of the attribute of the related concept or property.
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Figure 4.4: Semantic Repository
4.3 Proposed Semantic-Knowledge Model Archi-
tecture
This section defines the semantic storage layout to efficiently store the semantic
knowledge base and describes the whole structure of the proposed storage model.
The Semantic-Knowledge model is managed as four layers as follows:
• Inference Layer. This represents a query engine for the semantic repository.
It is used for interacting with the bottom layer of the architecture (data layer).
• Schema Layer. This represents the TBox knowledge bases that consist of the
Schema-Level.
• Lookup Layer. This represents an index for the data layer.
• Data Layer. This represents the ABox knowledge bases that contain all the
statements about concept individuals and values.
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Specifically, the Semantic-Knowledge model is a 4-tier architecture (inference,
schema, lookup and data).
The external layer (inference) presents the query operation and inference service for
semantic repositories. All queries are performed through this layer which then for-
wards them to both the lookup and data layers. A query engine for the Semantic-
Knowledge model supports the SPARQL RDF Query language. With the rapid
growth in the amount of graph-structured RDF data, SPARQL query process-
ing has received significant attention. SPARQL contains constructs which allow
queries to express patterns of triples, from the underlying ontology(s), to match
with. For example, the triple pattern:
EX:A ?property ?object.
matches all triples in the ontology whose subject is EX:A. The entries preceded
with the ‘?’ symbol (?property and ?object) are variables that are bound by the
query engine to values from the matched triples. Some examples of triples would
match this pattern are:
EX:A rdfs:lebel “A”.
EX:A rdfs:subClassOf EX:B.
The top layer (schema) provides a schema for the semantic data layer (ABox data).
The schema layer contains all custom concepts and properties definitions. It fur-
thermore defines their relations, describes their meanings and is therefore the basic
source of information about resources. It also contains sub-sumption relations be-
tween concepts (concept hierarchy) to which specialization and generalization can
be specified to enrich the semantics of the schema layer. Therefore, a semantic
schema is an important prerequisite. A well-modelled semantic ontology schema
provides rich semantics for the semantic data.
The middle layer (lookup) is a hierarchic data structure that helps to query the
engine quickly and locate the objects for the data layer, thereby turning it into
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a high-speed data store. It is built using the property assertions and designed to
provide fast access to the information it contains; all queries to the main data store
are performed using this index. Hence, it is possible to maintain a large, stable
data store with quick access. The lookup layer is an active data storage tree that
efficiently stores and manages in central memory. The purpose of the lookup layer
is to index properties so that the right subject and object values can be efficiently
located. In this approach, the structure has two node levels. Level 1 nodes hold
the property values. Each node has a pointer to a payload of subject and object
values that represent each property value in the data layer which represents the
level 2 nodes (Figure 4.5). To sum up, the core idea of the ABox lookups technique
is to index the entailed properties of the terminology, i.e., the TBox, so we use
these values to insert the assertional data of the ontology, i.e., the ABox, into the
data layer, and use range queries to retrieve the triples entailed by the properties
and the ABox assertions.
Figure 4.5: ABox lookups
The bottom layer (data) contains the main ABox data store. It is designed as a
storage layer, and is able to maintain ABox assertions and relations between ABox
and TBox objects. In other words, the data layer consists of ground sentences
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stating the information about individuals (i.e. relations between individuals and
concepts, and relations between named individuals).
Therefore, in summary: the architecture uses a large data store for ABox data
which is indexed to allow fast access and provides a semantic schema which defines
a hierarchical description of concepts and properties. Figure 4.6 shows the main
components of the system. The rules of the proposed process for mapping an
ontology to a semantic storage layer are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Semantic DL Model
Extraction and Classification
Loading and Store
Access Navigation
Request Query Engine 
Inference Layer
Results
Ontology TBox
Schema Layer
Ontology ABox
Indexing
lookup Layer
Data Layer
Semantic Storage Layer
Figure 4.6: Layered configuration of the Semantic-Knowledge model
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Algorithm 1 Semantic Storage Layer
1: Input: Semantic DL Model
2: Output: Semantic Storage Layer
3: Start Algorithm
4: Read semantic model document;
5: Check for consistency and completeness by analyzing the structure of semantic
model;
6: Extract semantic data;
7: Classify the semantic data according to semantic DL structure;
8: Classifier SemanticDataClassify (Semantic Data)
9: for each T in semantic model do
10: if T := clauses(T ) then
11: add(T )→ Triple(T )
12: end if
13: end for
14: for each A in semantic model do
15: if A := clauses(A) then
16: add(A)→ Triple(A)
17: end if
18: end for
19: Create mapping objects with auto mapper;
20: SemanticDataClassified ← CreateMappingObject(Mapper)
21: Triple(T ) maps→ Schema layer
22: Triple(A) maps→ Data layer
23: Loading semantic data into semantic storage layer;
24: The final output, Semantic Storage Layer (Schema layer & Data layer)
The semantic models are loaded into the semantic storage layer after parsing and
validation. The validation ensures that all resources are valid. The Semantic-
Knowledge model consists of ontology access navigation and ontology classifica-
tion. Ontology access navigation provides access to the ontology knowledge base
and interacts with the ontology classification to retrieve the desired ontological
knowledge from the ontology domain. Ontology classification implements cus-
tomised functions, for example, it allows finding the concepts in an ontology, all
the properties associated with a particular concept, all the concepts defined as a
domain or range of a particular property and all property relationships in an ontol-
ogy, relations between concepts (concepts hierarchy), etc. After the classification
phase, axioms about concepts and properties are put into the TBox (schema layer)
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and assertions about individuals are stored in the ABox (data layer).
Key Benefits and Reasons to store the TBox - ABox Split
To conclude this part, some of the key benefits of storing the individual ABox
and TBox the structural aspect and the conceptual relationships separately are as
follows:
• The improved semantic storage system is efficient since a single storage layer is
changed to a 4-tier architecture which provides optimization in terms of query
performance and storage.
• The handling of ABox semantic data is simple. The nature of an individ-
ual in the ABox is comparatively constant and can be captured with easily
understandable attribute-value pairs.
• ABox individual data evaluations can be done separately from conceptual eval-
uations.
• The semantic schema is stored separately, which is simpler and easier to un-
derstand. This allows the classification of the TBox to be performed without
considering the ABox.
• The results achieved by the new representation and completion of a semantic
storage system will pave the way for developers to design access restrictions
for the semantic repository or support classification inference, since the results
allow the reuse of the semantic store structure to propose a variety of novel
mechanisms to improve the state-of-the-art semantic repository proposals.
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Figure 4.7: The TBox - ABox Split
4.4 Test Storage Environment for Querying Ca-
pabilities
The Semantic-Knowledge model was tested and compared with the Jena 2 Seman-
tic Web Framework in the following setting: the Semantic-Knowledge model was
implemented in Java; and the Jena 2 Semantic Web Framework was modified and
applied to handle the ontologies. The Jena Framework includes an inference en-
gine for reasoning with the RDF and OWL data store. Also, Jena SDB specializes
in storing triples using relational databases (“MySQL”). For convenient semantic
ontology file format parsing and reasoner interaction, the OWL API is used.
Software and Hardware: The benchmarking was performed on a Dell Inspiron
machine with Intel(R) Core 2 Due CPUs (2.93GHz) with 4GB of RAM and 500GB
hard drive. The stores were run using a Windows 7 operating system, Java 1.6
with 1GB of maximum heap size, and an underlying MySQL Server (version 5.1)
running on the same machine. Also, Jena2-SDB version 1.3.23 which uses relational
databases (“MySQL”) for the storage of RDF and OWL, and Joseki4 which is a
query server for Jena were used.
2http://www.openjena.org
3http://www.openjena.org/SDB/
4http://www.joseki.org
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As a proof-of-concept, the experimental methodology aims to evaluate the seman-
tic storage model in order to investigate and determine the capabilities and the
limitations of the proposed approach. In order to obtain comparable measures
for the storage system, the Wine, University and AEO ontologies were selected to
test ontologies of varying complexity. The statistical facts of these ontologies are
shown in Table 4.1.
Ontology Concepts Properties Individuals
Wine 138 17 207
University 34 29 811
AEO 260 47 16
Table 4.1: Benchmark ontologies’ series
Wine Ontology is the example provided in the W3C document [Smith et al.,
2004]. Due to the comprehensive and balanced utilization of diverse expressions
of OWL, the Wine Ontology meets the requirements as an indicator regarding the
OWL support grade. It is utilized for determining and explaining the use of the
various constructors of OWL.
University Ontology defines fundamentals regarding the descriptions of univer-
sities and the activities that take place at these universities. The specifications of
the ontology give basic concepts and properties for describing university concepts
and covers a complete set of OWL constructs [Ameen et al., 2012].
The Athletics Event Ontology (AEO) is an ontology which explains athletic
track and field events. It was generated within BOEMIE, an EU-funded project.
The ontology’s conceptualization is based on the manual of the International Asso-
ciation of Athletics Federations (IAAF), which explains the rules and regulations
of the athletic events [Kaya et al., 2009].
These ontologies were utilized within the evaluation. All tests were performed
utilizing the same RDBMS. In order to evaluate the performance of the storage
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Results
Test Definition Dataset
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 times
Figure 4.8: The overall processing flow which includes the three steps involved
in running a test
model, the testing was carried out using queries of varying complexity, which
require data from different data sources as follows.
• TBox terminological axiom queries: This category consists of queries for par-
ticular OWL axiom types such as subconcepts, object properties domain and
range.
• ABox assertional axiom queries: This category consists of queries for the asser-
tions of a given individual such as concept assertion, object property assertion
and data property assertion.
The following metrics were used to test the proposed model:
• Response time. The time to issue a query, obtain results, and iterate through
them.
• Whether a run resulted in a timeout or error.
As a proof-of-concept, test queries were executed against a semantic storage sys-
tem (‘Jena store’) in order to investigate and point out the capabilities and the
shortcomings in comparison with the storage model proposed in this chapter. The
motivation to opt for Jena is its widespread acceptance, and its built-in support
for manipulating RDF data as well as developing ontologies [Khadilkar et al., 2012;
McBride, 2002; Wilkinson et al., 2003; Yu, 2007]. Query response time is measured
based on the process used in database benchmarks. To account for caching, each
query is executed three times consecutively and the average time is computed.
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Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the execution time of the proposed model which
demonstrates reasonable performance throughout the query storage system with
different type of queries. Furthermore, our analysis of the query results established
that the proposed model was sound for the dataset queries, as the query results
were correct for the corresponding queries.
Also, the test was performed on an e-commerce domain dataset [Bizer and Schultz,
2009] in which a set of products is offered by different vendors and consumers
have posted reviews about these products on various review sites to examine the
ontology storage with the following characteristic: a large number of triple patterns
(range of 105 to 106 explicit statements). The impact of the optimization of the
query plan, layout of the storage, as well as caching, as it pertains to the overall
model performance, relies heavily on the system’s concrete configuration and on
the kinds and number of queries which contribute to filling the caches. Thus, in
order to report meaningful outcomes, the system’s configuration was consequently
optimized and the system’s caches were warmed up by executing a query multiple
times. Additionally, the storage system ran on the same machine in an effort to
reduce the influence of network latency. In order to obtain a bird’s eye view of
the performance of the stores, Figure 4.11 shows query evaluation times against
the 105 e-commerce domain dataset. The query list used in the performance test
is shown in Table 4.2. Also, a dataset was generated with 10 sizes and for each
size value, an evaluation was conducted by sending 5 queries and calculating the
average processing time for all queries. Figure 4.12 demonstrates that the semantic
storage layer designed outperforms Jena and has reasonable performance even
with an increased number of datasets. Results from the evaluation show that the
Semantic-Knowledge model proves scalable.
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Figure 4.9: Execution time on TBox queries for various ontologies
Figure 4.10: Execution time on ABox queries for various ontologies
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Query Triples
Query 1 ?product bsbm:productFeature %ProductFeature2%.
?product bsbm:productPropertyNumeric1 ?value1 .
Query 2 %ProductXYZ% bsbm:productPropertyNumeric1 ?propertyNumeric1 .
Query 3 ?product rdfs:label ?label .
?product rdf:type bsbm:Product .
Query 4 ?offer bsbm:price ?price .
?offer bsbm:vendor ?vendor .
?vendor rdfs:label ?vendorTitle .
Query 5 ?review bsbm:reviewDate ?reviewDate .
?review rev:reviewer ?reviewer .
Query 6 ?vendor bsbm:country <http://downlode.org/rdf/iso-3166/countries#DE> .
Table 4.2: The query list used in the performance test [Fig. 4.11]
Figure 4.11: Response time of proposed Semantic-Knowledge model and Jena
model against the 105 e-commerce domain dataset
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Figure 4.12: An overview of the overall queries’ performance on the standard
datasets
Discussion
On the basis of the experimentation, the proposed storage method has, on average,
reduced performance cost by 8%-15% compared to the Jena storage model. When
running the query against the dataset of one million statements, the results of the
experiment and the evaluation also show reduced performance cost by 14% or so,
compared with the Jena storage model. Thus, increasing the size of the dataset up
to 1 million statements did not significantly alter its performance and still shows
that the proposed method substantially improves query response times. Further-
more, by designing an efficient semantic storage layout to store semantic data,
and by taking into consideration the relationships between the structure and each
component of the ontology documents, the Semantic-Knowledge model is efficient
as it presents hierarchical knowledge among concepts or properties where ontology
concepts, properties and individuals are mapped to a semantic storage layout that
represents TBox axioms and ABox facts. Most semantic triple stores use a single
storage layer; therefore, it is not easy for users to understand the meanings of
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data. The proposed model, however, makes it very easy to comprehend data, as it
is structured conveniently to enable the understanding of meanings, as it provides
hierarchical information. Therefore, the Semantic-Knowledge model makes data
management easy, because managers can identify ontologies semantically as well
as systematically, in addition to storage structure. Also, as previously mentioned,
semantic storage layout was built with a richer structure, consisting of an index
schema for the semantic data layer. The new representation and completion of
a semantic storage system has paved the way for designing access restrictions to
the semantic repository, since the results allow the semantic store structure to be
reused on a security semantic inference policy engine as described in Chapter 5.
4.5 Chapter Summary
A methodology has been proposed for enhancing the semantic storage model in or-
der to efficiently store a semantic knowledge base and to enhance the authorization
control system for safeguarding semantic data repositories.
The contributions of this chapter are twofold. First, the problems with seman-
tic storage system techniques for semantic models were identified. Secondly, the
drawbacks of earlier techniques were addressed by providing a new representation
of semantic storage systems for enhancing repository stores. The components of
the semantic knowledge base have been exploited in order to model the concept of
the semantic storage layout. Results from the evaluation show that a Semantic-
Knowledge model provides improved performance and stores the semantic data
completely with present hierarchical knowledge whereby ontology concepts, prop-
erties and individuals are mapped to the semantic storage layout represented by
TBox axioms and ABox facts.
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The results of the new representation of a semantic storage system provide the
groundwork for the next chapters on access restrictions to semantic repositories,
since the results allow the reuse of the semantic store structure to prepare a security
semantic inference policy engine.
CHAPTER 5
Authorization Control for a Semantic Data Repository
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As data and information management becomes increasingly popular, a signifi-
cant demand for methods to protect semantic data repositories has arisen. These
repositories have been applied successfully for interoperation purposes in various
domains such as healthcare organizations and life sciences, or for exploring large
online document repositories which store the domains’ information or act as inter-
mediaries to the data sources [Cheung et al., 2009]. Also, an increasing number of
industrial project initiatives have been recorded which choose to formalize applica-
tion knowledge using ontologies and Semantic Web representation languages RDF,
OWL [Ding et al., 2007; Lacy et al., 2005]. Due to the various sensitivities of data,
suitable access control mechanisms pertaining to the semantic repository should
be in place to ensure that only authorized users have access to the information in
its entirety.
Most semantic repositories are designed to manage semantic models but do not
deal with access rights. As in the case of databases that are traditional, data stored
inside a semantic database should be protected by granting access to authorized
users only. In the database area, over the past two decades, great advancements
have been made regarding access control and the management of data privileges
such as discretionary and mandatory access control models [Bertino and Sandhu,
2005]. Currently, semantic data repositories require the same attention. The
granting of authorization privileges to the semantic model’s entities and their
individuals should be addressed in order to prevent knowledge leakage and to
maintain high-quality services through secure access to the knowledge base. It
is presumed that ontology knowledge bases in repositories are secure in terms
of authorization; also, modifying metadata to obtain access by fraud has to be
prevented by other mechanisms. Therefore, supporting authorization privileges to
the semantic concepts and their individuals can increase flexibility in the access
control system since it allows the security manager to make decisions in accordance
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with the content of the data that needs to be accessed.
At present, the repository system falls short in the area of fine-grained access
rights. Designing semantic authorization control for secure semantic data reposi-
tories requires an answer to the following research questions:
- How can access rights be enforced on a semantic model’s entities and their
individuals in the semantic database through an inference policy engine?
- What is the right granularity for access control within an ontology?
- How is access permission propagated based on the interrelationships among
concepts to prevent illegal inferences?
- What effect does access control have on reasoning and modularization?
Depending on the nature of the application domain, the concepts can be charac-
terized by different degrees of sensitivity, and should be accessible only to those
users with the appropriate authorization privileges. This includes the question of
how and where to store them in the semantic repository.
The key aims of this chapter are to:
- Support the authorization access control model and enhance security systems
related to the ontology repositories (Figure 5.1).
- Introduce Two-level access control paradigms (TBox & ABox) to provide
highly secure operations for safeguarding semantic data repositories.
- Provide TBox access control for the construction of a TBox family which
regulates access to the concept individual level by designing access on a
concept level.
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- Propagate authorization-based construction of concept taxonomies for the
family TBox. Propagation of authorizations is allowed based on the semantic
relationships among concepts.
- Provide ABox Label-based Access Control for facts in the domain knowledge
(ABox).
An authorization security model is proposed that enforces access rights on a seman-
tic model’s entities and also propagates them on their individuals in the semantic
database through an inference policy engine. The technical contributions of the
research work documented in this chapter are:
- Use of the RBAC framework for the TBox access paradigm to protect the
semantic model’s entities (concepts) and their relations.
- Use of security clearance levels for the ABox access paradigm to provide a
finer granularity of control over ABox semantic individual data.
- Create two level authorization controls for securing semantic knowledge
TBox & ABox to enable the model to manage privileges of the users and
roles on TBox objects exclusively, so, the policy-based storage optimization
can achieve efficiency in the model’s performance.
- Results from the evaluation show that the authorization model proves scal-
able and does not affect reasoning results or modularization.
5.1 Motivational Example
Semantic databases and ontologies are expanding and penetrating many areas of
information and communications technology, and most categories of application.
They are gaining attention in many areas including industry, healthcare, content
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Figure 5.1: Different answers for the same query, based on access rights
management, and life sciences as an adequate means for accomplishing complex
information management tasks. A repository is the heart of such systems, storing
and managing extracted facts and information. Due to different degrees of concept
sensitivity, it is vital that many domain areas be able to protect knowledge and
sensitive information against unauthorized access. Providing a solution to this
problem, therefore, increases the usefulness and the potential impact of semantic
technologies in practice.
As motivating examples for our authorization model, two ontologies are utilized to
illustrate the method proposed in this chapter. In the first example, we consider
the ontology knowledge representation for a hypothetical manufacturing company
called High System (HS), which is a full-service provider of robotic automation.
The HS Corporation organizes information about products and their parts using a
semantic database. The example comprises three concept hierarchies: “HS”, “De-
signProfile”, and “Manufacturer”. The “HS” concept has specialized subconcepts :
Special Product (S:Products), and Special Parts (S:Parts). The “S:Parts” concept
has a specialized sub-concept, High System Robotic:Parts (HSR:Parts). Also, the
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“S:Products” concept has a specialized sub-concept, High System Robotic:Product
(HSR:Products). It also represents the relationships from concepts to other con-
cepts (such as IsDesignedIn, HasDesign) and to datatypes (such as HasSalesPrice,
ManufacturingCost and M-Code).
Clearly in a system of this kind, access control policies could state that users
must be allowed to access only the resources which they require for their work.
For example, a policy could state that some information regarding financial issues
such as the manufacturing cost of a part or products should not be visible to
developers. Also, external staff working on specific parts should see only the data
which they require for their work. For example, somebody who is working on an
HSR system should be able to see only HSR parts and specific information about
HSR products. Figure 5.2 shows an ontology for the HS manufacturing company.
As a second example, in order to shed more light on our proposed technique, we use
a portion of the NASA Investigation Organizer’s (IO) ontology, which is intended
to rectify any mishap in the conducting of investigations [Carvalho et al., 2005].
IO offers a common repository for a broad assortment of mishap-related data. It
permits investigators to create shared, precise, as well as meaningful connections
between causal models, evidence, recommendations, and findings. It has been uti-
lized to support investigations pertaining to a broad range of aerospace accidents.
It assists in the management and distribution of evidence, tracks the elements of
the investigation progress, and supports the development of the investigations (see
Figure 5.3). These two examples will be used to illustrate the method proposed
in our discussions throughout the chapter.
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Figure 5.2: HS manufacturing company
Figure 5.3: A portion of the NASA Investigation Organizer’s (IO) ontology
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5.2 Authorization-Security Model Architecture
The proposed mechanism is considered a highly structured multi-layered autho-
rization control for safeguarding semantic data repositories, with mechanisms
which fully support concept- and individual-based access control, so that the au-
thorization requirements are established not only for concepts in the TBox, but
also for their individuals in the ABox. In the top-level, role-based access control
is applied to protect the semantic model’s entities (concepts) and their relations.
The role-based model has several superior properties. It simplifies security man-
agement and administration, and provides more access control functions. It is
simple in logic and efficient in performance [Sandhu, 1994]. However, the current
role-based model is not suitable for fine-grained multilayer access control. There-
fore, security labels, a common paradigm for defining fine-grained access control of
ABox individuals data, satisfy multilayer access control requirements in the lower
level. However, using the same technique in both semantic knowledge base levels
would make the policy, in particular policy implementation, more expensive. For
example, using security labels for the TBox access paradigm is not a viable solution
because it requires the same TBox object to be assigned to different users (each of
which corresponds to a specific security requirement), which not only significantly
increases the administrative costs, but can also lead to data integrity problems.
From a practical perspective, the two-level access control paradigms provide a
high level mechanism for safeguarding semantic data repositories with many ad-
vantages, especially in making the policy process more efficient and more access
control functions are achieved. In addition, it manages the privileges of users
and roles regarding semantic TBox objects exclusively, so policy-based storage
optimization can be achieved, enhancing the model’s performance. In the next
sections, we will describe the model components and features in detail. Figure
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5.4 represents the components architecture of the semantic reasoner authorization
model, and Figure 5.5 represents the phases of the semantic authorization model.
Figure 5.4: Semantic Reasoner Authorization Model
Figure 5.5: Semantic Authorization Phases
5.3 Query Parser
In this chapter, we will focus on assertional queries. The query atoms can be
concept query atoms or relational query atoms. A concept query atom consists of
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variables and a concept expression. A relational query atom consists of at least
two identifiers for variables followed by a property expression.
Definition 5 (Assertional Query). Assertional query Q is a list:
Q = [q1, . . ., qn]
where each query atom qi is either of the form rdf:Type(a, C
q) or of the form P(a,
b) where a, b are variables and Cq is a concept and P is a property.
In rdf:Type(a, Cq) the concept assertion query is intended to obtain all individuals
from an ABox that are instances of a specified concept. In P(a, b) the relational
assertion query is used to obtain information about individuals and their relation-
ship to data or other individuals in terms of datatype or object properties. Figure
5.6 shows an example of concept and relational assertion query.
In SPARQL, a query contains capabilities for querying by triple patterns of the
form subject (s), predicate and object (o) [Prud’hommeaux and Seaborne, 2006].
An assertional query must satisfy the following conditions:
• Each property used in the predicate position is either a datatype or an object
property defined in the ontology, and each variable used in the subject or object
position is qualified by an rdf:type expression.
• If rdf:type is used in the predicate position, an OWL concept is used in the
object position.
The model translates each query atom into the formal expression Treq (i.e. TBox
request) to represent the TBox object that the user wants to access in the query.
The access request is translated into one of two different cases as follows:
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--------------------------------------------------------------------
Select ?x
Where
{
?x rdf:type HS .
};
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Select *
Where
{
?x Collected ?y .
?x rdf:type Investigator .
?y rdf:type PhysicalEvidence.
};
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 5.6: Example of concept and relational assertion query
• For a pattern rdf:type(a, Cq) with predicate = rdf:type and object = Cq in
query atom; it can be translated into the form Treq = rdf:type(o = Cq).
• For a pattern P(a, b) with predicate = P and predicate 6= rdf:type; it can be
translated into the form Treq = P(s = rdf:type(Cqa), o = rdf:type(C
q
b)) where
P can be an object property or datatype property, and Cqa and C
q
b are defined
in other query atoms by rdf:type(a, Cq) and rdf:type(b, Cq).
More precisely, the parser receives a query as input. The query is analysed to iden-
tify the object’s position (concept expression) and the predicate’s position defined
in the query. It returns the context structure closer to an abstract syntax (sum-
marized ABox query: list of all Treq requested triple patterns). The summarized
query is built from the original ABox query. In the summarized ABox, the query
is classified into three different types: concept assertion query, object property
assertion query or datatype property assertion query as illustrated in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7: Semantic ABox queries categorization
5.4 TBox Boundary Access Control
The semantic TBox access control system is specifically tailored to regulate ac-
cess to the semantic model’s entities (concepts) and their relations based on the
authorization policy. The authorizations on a concept can be expressed by rules
stating which access privileges a user can exert on each concept. Thus, the secu-
rity policy comprises a set of authorization rules that dictate the conditions under
which users will be allowed access to concepts. The TBox access control system
enforces the security rules and determines whether the TBox resource can be ac-
cessed. Semantically, the TBox access control is a crucial concept in the system
for protecting the ontology concept view, which is not only a partition but also a
bridge to the ABox access control system. In this section, we formalize the TBox
access control with an access authorization policy. We define subject, role, and
permission rules as the basic building blocks of our semantic security system. We
give a brief description of these as follows:
- Subject is the user or client, specified by a user ID;
- Role is a role name in which the user acts;
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- Rules define security policies and govern the rights and privileges of users.
Definition 6 (Authorization Control Policy Element). An authorization
policy element is defined as a pair (R, PR) where:
- R: the role of the user in this policy,
- PR: a set of capability/permission rules, each rule is defined as a pair (Act,
Tper), where Act is an operation mode and Tper is a TBox object.
Definition 7: An access authorization process is defined as follows :
• U R ⊆ (U × R) is the user-role assignment relation; where
- U is a set of subjects (users) in this policy U = {useri ∈ U};
- R refers to a set of roles of the subject who issues the request which describes
a discretionary user group R = {Ri ∈ R}.
• R P ⊆ (R × PR) is the role-permission assignment relation; where
- R is a set of roles ;
- PR is a set of permission rules, each PRi = (Act, T
per) represents a per-
mission where:
- Act: refers to the action as:
Act =

Read+ : access is allowed
Read− : access is forbidden
- Tper: represents a TBox object which the user is or is not allowed to
access.
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Figure 5.8: Assignment relations
Figure 5.8 represents the relationship between user, role and permission. From the
set of concept hierarchies, the syntax of Tper can take one of the following three
forms:
- Tper = rdf:type(o = Cpju , C
p
jv
, . . . , Cpjn);
- Tper = ObjectProperty(s = rdf:type(Cpiu , C
p
iv
, . . . , Cpin),
o = rdf:type(Cpju , C
p
jv
, . . . , Cpjn));
- Tper = DataProperty(s = rdf:type(Cpiu , C
p
iv
, . . . , Cpin),
o = DataType);
where Cpiu , C
p
iv
, . . . , Cpin and C
p
ju
, Cpjv , . . . , C
p
jn
represent concepts in the rule au-
thorization policy to which the user’s role determines access. Also, i is the index
of the subject concept hierarchy Hi; j is the index of the object concept hierarchy
Hj; (u, v, ..., n) define permission concepts in a hierarchy (u, v, . . . , n) ∈ {1,2,
. . . , m} where m is the number of concepts in the hierarchy.
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More precisely, when a user acting in a role submits a request to access the TBox
concept objects, the system retrieves from its policy base the set of access per-
mission rules associated with the user’s current role. The system will then check
whether the user’s role is permitted access to the TBox objects in the query by
evaluating the retrieved access rules.
From a functional point of view, our mechanism follows the closed-view approach
which allows access if there exists a corresponding positive authorization, and
denies it otherwise. So, an authorization-based TBox is specifically tailored to
regulate the access and operations that can be executed on the protected concepts.
We define a principle for the architecture of TBox access control mechanism:
• The user’s role is authorized to access the TBox object depending on the
appropriate access rules that match the user’s request. Otherwise, the user’s
role is denied access because his/her profile is not consistent with the re-
quested data.
5.4.1 Authorization Propagation
We are interested in obtaining consistent semantics as well as an effective, flexi-
ble mechanism for propagating authorizations through a concept hierarchy tree.
This section explains the technique for propagating authorizations based on the
interrelationships among concepts. This method provides great flexibility and ex-
pressive power for controlling access to semantically related data in a semantic
repository. The formal description of the propagation mechanism is represented
as: permissions would propagate automatically to the next lower level (i.e. prop-
agate down in the hierarchy tree). In terms of the hierarchy, we consider the
following propagation rule:
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- Propagation rule (Parent to child): Assume that C1 is a concept and C2 is a
child concept of C1. An access decision for concept C1 is propagated to concept
C2 only if C2 has no access control decision yet. Furthermore, assume that we
have an access decision, which says that we can read C1, and that we have
no specific action for C2. Then the “grant” permission for C1 is propagated
to C2 so that we can read C2 as well. Positive and negative authorizations
are propagated for different purposes: negative authorizations are propagated
to deny or prevent any possible direct or indirect unauthorized access, while
positive authorizations are propagated to ensure that subjects have access to
all the information to which they are authorized. Figure 5.9 illustrates the
idea.
Figure 5.9: Authorization Propagation Technique
5.4.2 Rule Evaluation
In order to implement the access control mechanism of the TBox level, we need
to devise a mechanism to ensure that TBox objects are secured. Once the user
submits an access request, the request must be evaluated against the authoriza-
tions stored in the repository. We divide the TBox control evaluation algorithm
into three stages:
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(1) Selecting relevant rules. The relevant rules are extracted from the repos-
itory based on the relation type and related concept hierarchy.
(2) Assigning permissions through the hierarchy. Inheritable permissions
can propagate from parent to child concepts if the concept has no access de-
cision assigned yet. The model propagates permissions along the inheritance
line until an explicit permission is found. There are two types of permissions:
explicit permissions and inherited permissions. Explicit permissions are as-
signed directly to a concept object. Inherited permissions are those that are
propagated to a concept from a parent concept. Inherited permissions ease the
task of managing permissions and ensure consistency of permissions among all
concept objects within a given container.
(3) Generating the view of the user’s role (Output View: Vrole). The
view of the user’s role defines a set of permission TBox concept objects which
the user’s role is allowed to access according to the rules applied as:
Vrole = (PO[]); where PO[i] = Tper. In the following, we describe two techniques
for evaluating access rights.
- Evaluation technique 1: (positive to sub positive) Assume that the user act-
ing in a role submits a query to access a concept and the concept in a query
has positive authorization. Then our access control will also include its
sub-concepts that also have positive permissions or no explicit permissions.
- Evaluation technique 2: (negative to sub positive) The user acting in a role
sends a query to access a concept and the concept in the query has negative
authorization. Then, our access control will descend along the hierarchy to
discover whether the user has positive authorization on any sub-concepts in
the concept’s subtree, and grants access to those with positive authoriza-
tion. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.10 illustrate the evaluation techniques used
in the design and implementation of the semantic reasoner authorization
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model.
Condition Decision
e.g. Treq = rdf:type(Cq)
Cp v Cq Authorized
Cp A Cq Not Authorized
Table 5.1: Authorization based on Context Concept Hierarchy (Cq: concept
in the query; Cp : concept in the permission rule (Tper) in which the user’s role
determines access)
Figure 5.10: Example of evaluation techniques along the concept hierarchy
where dashed lines represent the authorization decision by considering positive
authorization of sub-concepts
The task of deciding whether to grant access or not is performed by Algorithms
2 and 3. At the outset, the user activates a role from the set of roles that has
been assigned to him/her initially. A target TBox object is also formulated as
Treq format to give a formal expression of the target objects. Therefore, the access
request can be represented as (Rn, {Treq}) , where Rn is the user’s role, and {Treq}
is a set of TBox objects which the user wants to access. The semantic TBox access
control system returns the output view of the user’s role.
More specifically, the algorithm receives as input an access request and an autho-
rization rules base; it returns the view of the user, based on the rules applied.
Thus, the algorithm evaluates and prunes the target objects and then returns the
view of the user’s role which may or may not allow access.
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Algorithm 2 TBox Control evaluation Algorithm
Input:
1) Access request Π(Rn, {Treq}).
2) Permission Rules set PR
Output:
-) The view of user’s role Vrole
Method:
1: PR←−getRules(Rn);
2: PO[]= ∅;
3: Relevant Rule[]= ∅;
4: for each Treq in Π do //concept in the request: Cq
5: /*STEP 1: Extracting relevant rules rely on the relation type
6: and hierarchy*/
7: for each PRi ∈ PR do
8: // PRi = (Act, T
per), concept in the rule: Cp
9: if Tper.relation == Treq.relation ∧ Cq, Cp ∈ Hn then
10: Relevant Rule[i] = PRi;
11: i++;
12: end if
13: end for
14: // STEP 2: Assign permissions through the hierarchy
15: for each Cpk do
16: permission = action on Cpk;
17: for each Cki ChildOf(C
p
k) do
18: if Cki has no permission then
19: permission(Cki) = permission(C
p
k);
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
23: // After assigning permissions through the hierarchy
24: // The new rules should be generated
25: Rule[i]= (Act, Tper);
26: if Rule[].Act == read- then // no positive rule (Read+)
27: return null;
28: else
29: // Evaluate the request with positive rule
30: // STEP 3: Generating the view of the user’s role
31: // if Cq positive or negative authorization
32: if (Cq.read()==-1) ∨ (Cq.read() !=-1) then
33: //Check the positive subconcept
34: function Evaluation(Treq, Tper)
35: PO[]= Evaluation(Treq, Tper);
36: end function
37: end if
38: end if
39: end for
40: Vrole = PO[];
41: function ViewAnalyz(Vrole);
42: End
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Algorithm 3 Evaluation Rules Technique
1: function Evaluation(Treq, Tper)
2: //rdf:type predicate
3: for each Cpj in T
per do
4: if (Cpj ) v (Cqx) then
5: Permission Concept[] = Cpj ;
6: end if
7: end for
8: return Tper=rdf:type(Permission Concept[]);
9: //Binary predicates (property)
10: if Tper.ObjectProperty == 1 then //permit
11: // Evaluate the domain (i.e subject)
12: for each Cpi in T
per do
13: if (Cpi ) v (Cqx) then
14: s.Permission Concept[] = Cpi ;
15: end if
16: end for
17: if s.Permission Concept[] == null then
18: exit();
19: Evaluate next rule;
20: else
21: s = rdf:type(s.Permission Concept[]);
22: end if
23: // Evaluate the range (i.e object)
24: for each Cpj in T
per do
25: if (Cpj ) v (Cqx) then
26: o.Permission Concept[] = Cpj ;
27: end if
28: end for
29: if o.Permission Concept[] == null then
30: exit();
31: Evaluate next rule;
32: else
33: o = rdf:type(o.Permission Concept[]);
34: end if
35: Return Tper=ObjectProperty(s = s,o = o));
36: end if
37: DataProperty will have the similar steps;
38: end function
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Algorithm 4 Viewing Analysis Result
1: function ViewAnalyz(V iew)
2: if View= ∅ then
3: return emptyset;
4: else
5: function ABoxObjects(V iew, Li)
6: comment: (Pass the view of user’s role and
7: security clearance level of user);
8: end if
9: end function
More precisely, a permission rule list of the user’s role is retrieved to calculate the
access rights of a user. For each Treq, the algorithm evaluates the associated access
rules. During the evaluation, if the system realizes that the access rule is relevant,
based on the semantic relation type and the context concept hierarchy, then the
permission rule is added to the list Relevant Rule[]. After identifying the relevant
access rules that match the access request, the model ensures consistency of per-
missions among all concept objects by propagating and assigning a permission to
the concept object that does not yet have an access decision. Finally, to gener-
ate the output view of the user’s role, a basic evaluation process makes an access
decision for a given access request. An access request is evaluated as follows: the
evaluation is done by comparing the concept in the query (Treq), with the concept
in the rule authorization (Tper) by relying on the context concept hierarchy, and
the permission result (output view) is returned.
After the evaluation process, the viewing result is analysed (see Algorithm 4); if
the view equals an empty set, then an empty result is returned to the subject,
which means that access is denied. Otherwise, it returns a view of the user’s role
which contains permission TBox objects that the user’s role is allowed access to
according to the rules.
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5.5 ABox Access Control
The typical storage format in the ABox basically is a triple: subject or resource,
predicate or property, object or value. In this chapter, subject, predicate, and
object are used to describe a triple t = (s, p, o). Each triple is a complete and
unique fact about a specific domain, and can be represented by a link in a directed
graph. Thus, these store simple assertions about individuals in relationship with
the terminology. ABox is consistent with the TBox which contains a finite set
of assertions about individuals. Hence, from the TBox access control, the output
view of the user’s role defines TBox objects that are individual triple conjunctions
Vrole = {t1, t2,. . . , tn}.
ABox Label-based Access Control provides a finer granularity of control over ABox
individual’s semantic data. Hence, ABox access control is used to regulate access
to ABox individual’s semantic triples. Briefly, access to ABox triples is allowed
only if the user’s level dominates the ABox individual level. In the following, we
describe the methodology of the ABox label-access control in detail along with
several definitions. We introduce the definition of the clearance level of the user’s
role as follows:
Definition 8 (Clearance Level). Every role is specified with multilevel security :
Rn = {L} , where
- Rn is a role;
- L is a list of security clearance levels, L = {L1, L2, . . . , Ln }.
In the user-role assignment stage, the user is also assigned a security clearance
level from the possible levels associated with the role.
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Definition 9 (Security Label). Security label is a container of a target and a
clearance level where the target can be a role or a triple.
Specifically, the clearance level begins with security labels assigned to all users
acting in a role and having a given level of authority in the authorization system.
For example, the user activates a role from the set of roles that has been assigned
to him/her initially, and a user receives a security clearance that ensures the user
only has access to data for which s/he has a clearance. The security level is set
when the role is assigned to the user. Furthermore, every individual ABox triple
in the ABox store also has a minimum security clearance level (see Figure 5.11).
Definition 10 (Dominance relationship). Let Luser be the security clearance
level of the user acting in a role and Ltriple(ti) is the ABox triple sensitivity label,
then the user dominates the triple iff: Ltriple( ti) ≤ Luser
Depending on the security clearance level of the specific user, s/he will be able
to access a triple object according to the dominance relation. Users are assigned
security clearances that have to match or exceed the secrecy level of ABox objects
in order to be granted access.
The task of evaluating ABox objects is performed by Algorithm 5.
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Figure 5.11: Example of semantic role labelling with ABox objects clearance
level
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Algorithm 5 ABox Control evaluation Algorithm
Input:
1) The view of user’s role Vrole = {t1, t2,..., tn}
2) Security clearance level Luser
3) Sensitivity label of the triple Ltriple(ti)
Output:
-) Triple Objects (ti, ..., tn)Authorized Triple
Method:
1: j=0;
2: for each ti ∈ Vrole do
3: if (Ltriple(ti) ≤ Luser) then
4: Result[j]= ti;
5: j++;
6: end if
7: end for
8: Return Result[];
5.6 Motivational Case Study
To illustrate the flexibility, the following are some examples of rules derived based
on Definitions 6 (Authorization control policy) & 7 (Access authorization process)
and the HS manufacturing ontology presented in Figure 5.2.
Shown in Table 5.2(a), permission rule PR1 depicts the authorization which grants
(a) Permission Rules:
PR1= (Read
+, rdf:type(o = HSR:Parts, HSR:Products))
PR2= (Read
−, rdf:type(o = HS, S:Parts, S:Products))
PR3= (Read
+, hasDesign(s = rdf:type(HSR:Parts),
o = rdf:type(DesignProfile)).
PR4= (Read
−, hasDesign(s = rdf:type(HS, S:Parts, S:Products,
HSR:Products),
o = rdf:type(DesignProfile)).
(b) Input: Query sent by user4:
Select ?x
Where
{ ?x rdf:type HS .};
Table 5.2: First Example: (a) permission rules to be respected by user 4 (b)
input query
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a subject the permission to gain access to the resource concepts <HSR:Parts,
HSR:Products>. PR2 denies access to some concepts in the same hierarchy where
rdf:type is used as the predicate position. PR3 describes another authorization
which grants the subject permission to gain access to the resources described as
HSR:Parts concept and hasDesign relation with DesignProfile concept. PR4 denies
access to some concepts in the hierarchy with the relation hasDesign and Design-
Profile concept. In Section 5.4, we presented the TBox access control system that
can be used to ensure the protection of the ontology concept view. Basically, the
TBox access control algorithm, if any permit rule exists, will return the ontology
concept view of the subject. In the example shown in Table 5.2(b), the user sends
a request to retrieve the individuals of the HS concept, and rdf:type is used in the
predicate position. The evaluation algorithm identifies the relevant and priority
access rules PR1, PR2 that fit the access request because they have the same
predicate position and are related to the same concept hierarchy. From positive
authorization PR1, the permission result is derived based on the evaluation tech-
nique designed before. In this example, the TBox concept object in access request
is “HS concept”; however, the user has permission to access the lower level TBox
concept objects “HSR:Parts & HSR:Products” only. As a consequence, our model
will search along the hierarchy to discover whether the user has positive autho-
rization to its lower level and returns the ontology concept view of the user, in
this example: the permission values: rdf:type(o = HSR:Parts, HSR:Products).
In the ABox store, every triple in the semantic database has been assigned by a
security clearance level (L1|L2|L3). The output view (i.e. Vrole) of TBox access
control has a set of triple conjunctions in the semantic database. So based on
his/her clearance level, the user will be allowed to access the triple objects that
have a secrecy level lower than the user’s. For example, Vrole = (t1, t2, t3, t4, t5,
t6, t7). Triples t1, t4 have clearance level L1. Triples t2, t3, t5 have clearance level
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L2 and t6, t7 have a clearance level L3. Also, for example, user4 has a clearance
level L2. Therefore, user4 is allowed to access only t2, t3, t5 and based on the
dominance relation, also has access to t6, t7 as shown in Figure 5.12.
Figure 5.12: Example 1: user 4 access level
Example 2: From NASA Investigation Organizer’s ontology.
(a) Permission Rules
PR1= (Read
+, Collected(s = rdf:type(Investigator),
o = rdf:type(PhysicalEvidence)).
PR2= (Read
−, Supports(s = rdf:type(PhysicalEvidence),
o = rdf:type(Hypothesis)).
(b) Input: Query sent by user2:
SELECT * WHERE
{
?x Collected ?y .
?y Supports ?z .
?x rdf:type Investigator .
?y rdf:type PhysicalEvidence.
?z rdf:type Hypothesis.
};
Table 5.3: Second Example: (a) permission rules to be respected by user 2
(b) input query
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In the example shown in Table 5.3, the user sent a request to retrieve the investi-
gator individuals with the collected physical evidence and to retrieve the physical
evidence which supports the hypothesis.
PR1 describes the authorization which grants a subject the permission to gain ac-
cess to the resources described as Investigator concept with Collected relation to
the physicalEvidence concept. PR2 denies access to the concept physicalEvidence
with relation Supports and the Hypothesis concept as a range concept. After evalu-
ating the target object, the ontology concept view of the subject based on the input
query is Collected(s = rdf:type(Investigator),o = rdf:type(PhysicalEvidence)).
In the ABox store, the process is similar to that in the previous example. For ex-
ample, Vrole = (t1, t2, t3). Triples t1 has a clearance level L1. Triples t2, t3 have
clearance level L2. Also, for example, user2 has a clearance level L1. Therefore,
user2 is allowed access to t1 and, based on the dominance relation, also has access
to t2, t3 as shown in Figure 5.13.
Figure 5.13: Example 2: user 2 access level
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5.7 Test Setting for Access Restrictions to Se-
mantic Knowledge Base
The semantic reasoner authorization model was implemented in Java. It used
the Jena 2 Semantic Web Framework to handle ontologies. The Jena Framework
includes an inference engine for reasoning with RDF and OWL data store. Also,
Jena SDB specializes in storing triples using relational databases (“MySQL”).
In this experiment, we use ontology knowledge representation for an HS manu-
facturing company. We conduct an experiment in order to evaluate the effects of
access control on reasoning and modularization. We thereby evaluate any query
processing overhead that might be introduced with access control mechanisms. For
optimal performance, a policy database is stored locally in the semantic reposi-
tory. Also, the centralized repository for managing authorization policy rules was
improved to enhance the scalability and performance by dividing the storage rules
based on the relational type. The impact of the optimization of the query plan,
layout of the storage, as well as caching, as it pertains to the overall model per-
formance, relies highly on the system’s concrete configuration and on the kinds
and number of queries which fill the caches. Thus, in order to report meaningful
outcomes, we optimized the system’s configuration and warmed up the system’s
caches by executing a query multiple times. The details are as follows.
Performance and Impact Studies: To evaluate the performance and the im-
pact of access control rules on reasoning and modularization, we conducted several
tests based on the following three parameters.
- Size of Knowledge base: We increased the size of the ontology knowledge base
in order to investigate and point out the capabilities and the shortcomings of
our semantic reasoner authorization model.
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- Authorization model with a clearance level: The end-to-end response time of
semantic reasoner authorization model was measured with a clearance level.
- Number of access control rules: We show the impact of the number of access
control rules on the system’s performance.
For the test, we generated a dataset (HS manufacturing ontology) comprising 10
sizes ranging from 104-105 knowledge base, and for each size value, we randomly
tested different queries; the average processing times for all queries were computed
and added. Each query was executed five times and we calculated the mean pro-
cessing time for each. As a proof-of-concept, the evaluation tests executed requests
with and without rule enforcement in a model. Thus, we evaluated a simple direct
query system to determine the overhead for the semantic reasoner authorization
model. In the direct query, the user request sends a query directly to the semantic
repository without any restriction on access. Access control is done by responding
to the user after checking the role’s privilege. We also evaluated the semantic
reasoner authorization model after we applied the security clearance level.
Results and Discussion: To evaluate the impact of the knowledge base size
and show the overhead due to access control, we generated a dataset with 10 dif-
ferent sizes as mentioned above. For each size value, we conducted an evaluation
by sending 10 queries and calculating the average processing time for all queries.
The outcome showed that the overhead due to access control does not impact
on the performance. Closer inspection reveals that the processing time with rule
enforcement in our model is slightly slower than the direct query system in our
experiment. As shown in Figure 5.14, enforcing access control adds a minor over-
head to the processing time due to evaluating the authorization rules against the
role’s privileges including privilege levels. The results show that, even for a large
knowledge base, the model is scalable.
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Furthermore, Figure 5.15 illustrates the impact of the number of access control
rules on the semantic performance. For each given number of authorization rules,
we tested an evaluation by sending a single query that was executed five times and
we calculated the mean processing time for the query. The results reveal that the
processing time increases linearly as the number of access control rules increases.
Also, the semantic reasoner authorization model is evaluated with a security level
as explained in Section 5.5. Experimental results show improved performance with
both concept queries and relational queries (see Figure 5.16). The ABox security
system improves the performance by avoiding security label comparisons during
runtime execution. For example, the comparison result associated with the triple
object is retrieved from the persistent sensitivity label comparison results table.
Furthermore, for a large triple table, the number of results that are returned for a
particular level of clearance compared with the number of results before applying
security sensitivity level is usually low.
Figure 5.14: End-to-end processing time of semantic authorization model and
the direct query system
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Figure 5.15: Semantic reasoner authorization model performance evaluated
by access control rules
Figure 5.16: End-to-end response time of semantic reasoner authorization
model with a clearance level
5.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a semantic reasoner authorization model was proposed to secure
access to semantic repositories. The model is able to restrict access to confidential
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knowledge that is represented using ontologies, and can regulate access to both
the ontology’s concepts and their individuals.
The main contribution of this chapter is the model that fully supports concept-
and individual-based access control. From a functional perspective, the model
consists of two main components: TBox Access Control for the construction of
the TBox family and ABox Label-based Access Control for facts in the domain
knowledge. The model also supports a flexible mechanism for propagating au-
thorizations through a hierarchy concept tree. Experiments were conducted in
order to evaluate the effects of access control on reasoning and modularization.
The evaluation showed that the semantic authorization model does not affect the
reasoning results or modularization.
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The previous chapter described a multi-layered access control model for safeguard-
ing semantic data repositories against unauthorized access, referred to as the Se-
mantic Reasoner Authorization Model (SRAM)1 [Alamri et al., 2013].
In SRAM, a user will be assigned to corresponding roles according to his/her
responsibilities. Since a user performs a certain role, s/he needs to be provided with
data access permissions. To enhance efficiency, the mode of role inheritance can be
used that reflects the relationship between role duty as well as role permissions. It
is normal to utilize hierarchy to aggregate permissions; that is, a role is supposed
to inherit the permissions assigned to roles below it in terms of hierarchy. The
following questions elaborate our intention:
- How is the hierarchy of roles, views and activities defined and how can a
formally modelled inheritance mechanism be associated with each hierarchy?
- How can limitations be imposed on permission inheritance in the role hierar-
chy? This chapter investigates the inheritance traits when inheritable permis-
sions are set as private.
- How can the conflicts that appear with multiple inheritance be addressed?
The key aims of this chapter are to:
- Enhance the SRAM access control model with supporting inheritance mod-
elling in order to simplify the specification of the security policy;
- Provide a new strategy to administer the concept of role hierarchy;
- Design a certain flexibility to address the conflicts arising from multiple inher-
itance.
1The abbreviation (SRAM) is used in chapter to refer to the Semantic Reasoner Authorization
Model
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In this chapter, the SRAM access control model is enhanced with role-based ad-
ministration and a conflict management strategy (Figure 6.1). The contributions
of the research documented in this chapter are:
- Role-based administration is used to enhance the hierarchical model for accu-
rately depicting permission inheritance and supporting private rules.
- A label conflict resolution strategy is used in which each role is equipped with a
special label to resolve conflicts by evaluating the special labels for the various
access roles and generate a resultant rule.
Figure 6.1: Semantic reasoner authorization model with new enhancement
6.1 Preliminaries
This section gives a brief description of the SRAM model based on core RBAC,
presented in the previous chapter [Alamri et al., 2013]. Also, a short introduction
is given to the specification of core RBAC, highlighting the inheritance properties
of role hierarchies. Also, several scenarios are described that demonstrate how
inheritance of rights can produce undesirable results.
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6.1.1 Role Assignment in SRAM
The SRAM secures access to semantic repository concepts and to their individuals
in the semantic database using an inference policy engine. Specifically, role-based
access control can act as an efficient means of authorization management in the
SRAM model. The model policy based on RBAC is formalized by identifying the
role, subject, and permission rules as our fundamental semantic security system
building block.
In the proposed model, access control is defined as follows. Figure 6.2 offers a
description of SRAM based on core RBAC.
Definition 11. In SRAM, a security access control rule is defined as a two tuple
(R, PR) of the role of the user and the capability matching rules.
Figure 6.2: SRAM based on core RBAC
The SRAM model is fundamentally defined in terms of individual users being
assigned to roles and permissions being assigned to roles. As such, a role is a
means of naming many-to-many relationships among users and permissions. In
this chapter, the SRAM model is formalized with a modelling role hierarchy struc-
ture. Semantically, the purpose of a role hierarchy is to extend the possibility of
permission acquisition and role-activation beyond the explicit assignments.
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6.1.2 Role-based Hierarchy
In computer systems security, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) has been in-
troduced for controlling user access to tasks that are normally part of the user’s
role in the organization [Sandhu et al., 1996]. RBAC offers a powerful means of
specifying access control decisions. In particular, the RBAC model supports the
specification of user-role associations (i.e., user authorizations to perform roles),
and role hierarchies.
Role hierarchies in the RBAC framework allow the occupants of superior roles to
inherit all the positive access rights of their inferiors, and conversely ensures that
the occupants of inferior positions inherit any prohibitions that apply to their su-
periors. The model of RBAC assumes that, if there is a role hierarchy, then access
rights are inherited upwards through the hierarchy and the set of roles available
to a user is aggregated downwards [Belokosztolszki, 2004; Ferraiolo et al., 1995,
2007; Kuhn et al., 2010]. The following section discusses the inheritance proper-
ties of role hierarchies and demonstrates how inheritance of rights can produce
undesirable results.
6.1.3 The Use of Role Hierarchies
Definition 12. A role hierarchy is a graph of a binary relation RH v R × R of
the partially ordered set of roles R.
In an SRAM, a user will be assigned to corresponding roles according to his/her
permission and duty. When a user performs a particular role, s/he has to be pro-
vided with access permissions. Inheritance can be utilized to improve efficiency
i.e., a role can inherit the permissions specified to roles that are below it (Figure
6.3). It is an effectual concept in that it simplifies the specification of the security
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Figure 6.3: A role hierarchy
policy; however, it has been observed that it can have a number of inconvenient
consequences. The following scenarios demonstrate how inheritance rights pro-
duce undesirable results.
Multi-level secure systems: The inheritance traits make role hierarchies in-
effective as a means of implementing multi-level secure systems using role-based
methods. Most significantly, senior roles have access to all permissions assigned to
junior roles. This might be unsuitable within a number of organizations, where se-
nior managers are neither capable of, nor have sufficient experience in performing
the tasks of more junior personnel. Furthermore, it becomes unfeasible to separate
role responsibilities that constitute a common senior role (except obviously where
no user is assigned to that senior role).
Separation of duties: This scenario may make the inheritance of access rights
down the hierarchy undesirable. For example, some organizations provide suffi-
cient mechanisms to ensure that there is a system of checks and balances in place
for their employees. For example, a person who endorses cheques should not be
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the same person who can issue a cheque. Since the senior role inherits all the per-
missions of a junior role, then a senior financial officer will be given both rights.
A more effective approach is required to restrict such rights from being granted to
senior roles.
Private rule: Some permissions granted to a junior role should not be inherited
by a senior role. For example, every role has some private permissions to certain
data that can be accessed only by the owner role and the access right to these data
cannot be inherited by a senior role. Regarding the protection of roles’ private
permissions, the classical RBAC model introduces a “private role” concept which
separates private permissions from public permissions, and encapsulates them in
private roles and public roles respectively. Private roles can only be the leaf nodes
in a role hierarchy which are not inherited, so the private permissions can be
protected. Although this method effectively solves the problem of private permis-
sion’s inheritance, it greatly increases the number of roles. Also, this technique
prevents the hierarchy from accurately depicting permission distribution. In this
chapter, an extensible and flexible mechanism for permission inheritance within a
role hierarchy is introduced in order to simplify the role assignment inheritance in
SRAM.
6.2 Proposed Model
The proposed model has two main aims: 1) to provide an improved inheritance
model, and 2) to solve authorization conflicts using a special label technique.
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6.2.1 Role-based Administration
The major motivation for adding role hierarchy to the SRAM is to simplify role
management. However, the role hierarchy concept has several limitations as dis-
cussed previously, and flexibility is needed in order to overcome them. Thus, two
types of authorization rules are defined:
- Inheritable rule (
→
r ) : can be propagated to the higher level. More precisely,
the rule that is assigned as an inheritable rule can be inherited by a senior role.
- Private rule (
9
r ): cannot be propagated outside the role. More precisely, it
cannot be granted to a user who has not been assigned to the role.
Hence, we make the following modifications to the original SRAM model:
PR: (Act, Tper, M)
where the permission rule has three components: Act refers to the action, Tper
represents a TBox object and M represents the rule’s mode either →r or 9r . By
classifying the rule into
→
r and
9
r , the administrator has the convenience of relying
on inheritance within an RH structure.
Definition 13. An extended TBox authorization policy is defined as a three-tuple
policy = (R, RH , PR) where: PR= (Act, Tper, M).
Our administration model is an extension of the RBAC model. Note that our
model can be interpreted as a standard RBAC model. In this case, all rule per-
missions are upwards inheritable. One basic objective of this new method is to
optimize multi-level secure systems which always require some private rules and
separation of duties. In order to achieve this, the permission rule defines action,
object and the rule’s mode. Thus, RBAC-SRAM has two fundamental permission
modes: inheritable and private, both of which are linked to the permission rules.
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More precisely, we require that the assignment of permissions to roles must reflect
the “power” of the permissions. Formally, we require that either of the following
two constraints be satisfied:
- Constraint 1: (Ri → Rj) ∧ RPRx.
→
r
j
- Constraint 2: (Ri → Rj) ∧ RPRx.
9
r
j
Constraint 1, Ri is senior to Rj, and R
PRx.
→
r
j denotes that Rj has rule PRx con-
straint with
→
r , then this rule is inheritable and is inherited by Ri. Constraint 2,
Ri is senior to Rj, and R
PRx.
9
r
j denotes that Rj has rule PRx constraint with
9
r ,
then this rule is private and is accessible only by Rj. Figure 6.4 illustrates the
process of role-based administration.
Figure 6.4: Role-based administration for role hierarchy
Assume the user u is assigned to R2. The role-permission assignment algorithm is
as follows:
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Algorithm 6 Procedure role-assignment
1: Input: the user u’
2: Input: the role desired R2
3: Calculate ↓Ru(R5’), the junior roles and the corresponding inheritance manner
from the current role
4: Calculate PR(PR4), as the permissions that are assigned directly to the R2
5: Calculate PR’(PR1, PR3) as the junior role possess the permissions
6: Procedure role-assignment
7: Initial Permission IPR = PR4
8: for every junior role do
9: if PR
Assign→ →r then
10: per= IPR ∪ ↓RuPR.→r
11: end if
12: end for
13: Output(R2, PR4, PR1) represent user scope
14: END
Definition 14 (SRAM Permission Inheritance). Assume Ri ∈ R and u ∈
U and define the user-role assignment relation U R ⊆ U × R. If the user u is
explicitly assigned to the role R, then u inherits all permission rules in ↓Ru that
are specified as inheritable, where ↓Ru represents all junior roles of R.
Definition 15 (User Authorization Scope). Let a user u be assigned to a role
Ri; a user scope of the role hierarchy contains all the roles to which u is implicitly
assigned via the user-role and role hierarchy relations. That is, when u is assigned
to Ri, a user scope is defined as authorized-perms [u]=(R
PR
i , ↓RuPR.
→
r
i ).
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A new role inheritance method allows us to employ an existing highly-optimized
model to carry out these tasks and helps to overcome the limitations that occur
with the inheritance traits of the role hierarchy. For a comparison with RBAC,
Figure 6.5 illustrates the difference between RBAC and RBAC-SRAM where U:
user, R: role, PR: permission rule and RH : role hierarchy. Also, it can be seen
that the addition of not only the user role hierarchy, but also the role hierarchy
administration further enhances the hierarchical model.
(a) RBAC (b) RBAC-SRAM
Figure 6.5: The difference between RBAC and RBAC-SRAM
A more powerful implementation of RBAC is provided with SRAM. The rules
have a new administration option with the enhanced SRAM-RBAC infrastructure.
This administration option has the ability to configure the mode of the rule. The
advantages of the role-based administration are summarized as follows:
. The inheritance characteristic of the role hierarchy makes it effective for im-
plementing multi-level secure systems using role-based methods.
. Roles have been enhanced to support private rules which can be accessed only
by the role itself.
. The behaviour of roles has been enhanced to provide separation of duty func-
tionality.
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6.2.2 Conflict Analysis and Resolution for the Semantic
Reasoner Authorization Model
The introduction of a mechanism for permission inheritance within a role hierarchy
might end up producing conflicts due to the concurrence of both positive and
negative authorizations. Most methods of conflict resolution select one of the
conflicting rules and give it priority over the rest [Bertino et al., 1993; Cuppens
et al., 2007; Ma et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2010a]. Other techniques base the
ultimate decision on the ‘majority rules’ notion. The inheritance hierarchy between
roles leads to possible conflicts. In access control, due to conflict among matched
valid authorizations, a conflict resolution strategy is needed.
6.2.2.1 Conflict Occurrence
Role hierarchies support the multiple inheritance concept, which offers the capacity
to inherit authorizations from two or more role sources. On the negative side, with
multiple inheritances, there can be several conflicts, so a certain level of flexibility
is needed during resolution. We have summarized two conflict cases in this model,
as shown in Figure 6.6.
When R1 inherits permissions from two roles R2, R3, there are two possible con-
flicts:
Case 1: A positive permission PR+ is assigned to R2 and its corresponding nega-
tive permission PR− is assigned to R3. Formally:
(R2, R3) ∈ RH ∧ RPR
+
x
2 ∩ RPR
−
x
3 6= ∅
Case 2: Conflict between sub-concept objects’ authorization rules. R2 has access
permission to concept C1, C2, whereas R3 has negative permission to concept
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C2. Formally:
(R2, R3) ∈ RH ∧ RPR
+
x
2 (C1...Cn) ∩ RPR
−
y
3 (Cj) 6= ∅, j ∈(1,...,n)
(a) Case 1 (b) Case 2
Figure 6.6: Conflict cases due to multiple inheritance
6.2.2.2 Survey of Conflict Resolution Strategies
Possible conflicts that arise from the inheritance of both negative and positive au-
thorizations are resolved via a particular policy included in the model. Examples
of conflict resolution policies which have been suggested in various proposals are as
follows: denials-take-precedence [Bertino et al., 1993], most-specific takes prece-
dence, most-specific together with the concept of strong and weak authorizations
[Bertino et al., 1999; Rabitti et al., 1991], explicit specification of priorities [Shen
and Dewan, 1992], and explicit specification of the policy to be applied [Jonscher
and Dittrich, 1995]. We evaluate these methods for dealing with possible conflict
situations in the following.
Deny rules take precedence over allow rules. A negative authorization may further
override positive explicit authorizations. This strategy can address conflicts. How-
ever, using the denials-take-precedence strategy, as the negative authorization rule
always takes precedence over the others, the positive rule is ineffective as it is never
applied. This demonstrates the strategy’s lack of sophistication. Another strategy
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ensures that positive authorizations are always adopted when a conflict occurs.
In other words, according to this principle, if we have one reason to authorize an
access and another to deny it, then we authorize it. Other approaches suggest pri-
oritizing authorizations according to the order in which authorizations are listed
(i.e., the authorization that is encountered first is the one that applies). It is clear
from this discussion that different approaches can be taken to deal with positive
and negative authorizations. Also, although some solutions might be more effec-
tive than others, none of them offers “the perfect solution”. Whichever approach
we take, we will always discover one circumstance that cannot be accommodated
and resolved. In addition, we notice that different conflict resolution policies are
not mutually exclusive. For instance, one can attempt to resolve conflicts with the
most specific-takes-precedence policy first, and apply the denials-take-precedence
principle to the remaining conflicts.
The support of negative authorizations does not come at no cost: there is a price
to pay in terms of authorization management as well as less clarity of the specifi-
cations. However, the complications produced by negative authorizations are not
due to the negative authorizations themselves, but to the different semantics that
the presence of permissions and denials can have, that is, to the complexity of the
different real-world scenarios and requirements that may need to be captured. For
this reason, most current systems that adopt negative authorizations for excep-
tion support place an imposition on particular conflict resolution policies, or give
support to a very restricted conflict resolution form. More recent approaches are
moving towards the development of flexible frameworks with the support of multi-
ple conflict resolution and decision policies. In the following, a flexible framework
is proposed which supports multiple-conflict resolution.
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6.2.2.3 Label Conflict Resolution Method
Definition 16 (Conflict-free). Permission rules are conflict-free if: R
PR+
x ∩
R
PR−
y = ∅
Figure 6.7: Conflict caused when positively and negatively authorized rules
overlap
A policy conflict is caused when their intersection is non-empty, as illustrated in
Figure 6.7. Security administrators prefer to detect a conflict in advance. For con-
flict cases, we introduce a conflict management system where the goal is to address
conflicts between matched valid authorization rules or authorization objects. The
efficiency of the model is increased if a conflict resolution mechanism is in place.
The main idea behind the label conflict resolution method is that a strategy of con-
flict resolution does not inevitably ensure that all of the conflicts will be resolved.
Therefore, there may remain some conflicts amidst some actual authorizations. If
it can be proved that a strategy can successfully address all conflicts, then it is
called an effective strategy. We propose a conflict management technique to iden-
tify and resolve conflicts in a centralized manner. Our solution is based on special
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labels that are basic structures useful for rule selection in conflict resolution. In
SRAM, a role comprises a set of permissions that can be granted to a user. In this
section, we equip each role with a special label indicating the level of a particular
role (see Figure 6.8). This will assist if the role inherits the permissions from other
roles; if there is a conflict, the conflict management system compares the labels
of the inherited role in order to resolve the conflict. We introduce the strategy as
follows.
Definition 17 (Special label). A special-label is a pair of role and level, ` =(R,
L) where R is a role and L is a level.
Definition 18 (Special label ordering). Special labels are ordered according to
their L component.
Figure 6.8: Role special label
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Security levels are assigned to roles by the security administrator. Also, the secu-
rity labels (consisting of a role and a security level) are implemented by storing
the nodes of the role hierarchy and specified security level locally in the semantic
repository.
Strategy: The special label can effectively resolve conflicts. Let us assume that
there is an actual conflict between two access control rules. An actual conflict
occurs when the Permission(act, Tper) ∩ Prohibition(act, Tper) 6= ∅. The label
conflict resolution strategy consists of the following two rules:
- `i = `j then Deny rules take precedence over allow rules;
- `i < `j then (Permission ∨ Prohibition) of `j takes precedence over `i.
The first rule states that a negative authorization prevails if the labels are on the
same level. According to the second rule, the actual Permission or Prohibition of
the higher label prevails. Using these rules, we cannot obtain both Permission and
Prohibition at the same time. We can conclude that there is no actual conflict,
which contradicts the assumption. As a consequence, the resolution method can
effectively resolve the modality conflict.
The results obtained in this chapter have supported the proposed semantic rea-
soner authorization model in two ways: 1) it has the ability to configure the mode
of the rule such as inheritable or private rule; 2) it provides a more structured
model for handling conflicting rules.
In the following, Algorithm 7 illustrates the steps to resolve policy rule conflicts.
Also, using Figure 5.2, we explain a simple case of conflict between matched au-
thorization objects. Table 6.1 sums up the different conflict resolution methods
and the proposed method.
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Example conflict scenario: Consider the ontology example in Figure 5.2 and
three roles. R1 inherits permissions from two roles R2, R3. A positive permission
PRi is assigned to R2 which permits access to concepts S:Parts and HSR:Parts,
whereas R3 has PRj negative permission to the concept HSR:Parts. A conflict
management system is introduced to address conflicts between matched valid au-
thorization rules or authorization objects based on the special labels assigned to
every role. In this scenario, if R2 has a special label which is at the same level as
the label assigned to R3, then deny will take precedence whereby the HSR:Parts
concept is not allowed to be accessed or viewed. However, if R2 is assigned a
higher label than R3, then the rule with the higher role label will prevail and the
HSR:Parts concept can be accessed and viewed by R1.
Methods Description
Denials-take-precedence Negative authorization rule always
takes precedence
Permissions-take-precedence Positive authorization rule always
takes precedence
Prioritizing authorization The authorization that is encoun-
tered first is the one that applies
Explicit specification rule Explicit specification of the rule to
be applied
Based on a special label Use different conflict strategies
`i = `j then Deny rules take prece-
dence;
`i < `j then (Permission ∨ Prohibi-
tion) of `j takes precedence
Table 6.1: An analysis of conflict resolution methods
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Algorithm 7 Resolve Disjoint Conflicting Authorization
1: procedure RuleComparison(PotentialConflictSet {PR1 . . . PRk})
2: for i ←− 1 to k do
3: Rx → PR+i , Ry → PR−i+1
4: for each Ci in PR
+
i & Cj in PR
−
i+1 do
5: // Compare every Ci in PR
+
i with Cj in PR
−
i+1
6: if (Ci = Cj) then
7: Collect the conflict subpermission concept objects
8: Conflict[] = Concept objects
9: end if
10: end for
11: // Comparison of the labels to resolve conflict
12: if (`n = `m) then
13: // Deny rule takes precedence over allow rule
14: // Produce new (+) rule which does not include Conflict[] objects;
15: Produce new per rule = PR+x ;
16: Result = PR+x & PR
−
i+1
17: else if (`n < `m) then
18: // Deny rule takes precedence over allow rule
19: // Produce new (+) rule which does not include Conflict[] objects;
20: Produce new per rule = PR+x ;
21: Result = PR+x & PR
−
i+1
22: else if (`n > `m) then
23: // Allow rule takes precedence over deny rule
24: // Produce new (-) rule which does not include Conflict[] objects;
25: Produce new prohi rule = PR−y ;
26: Result = PR+i & PR
−
y
27: end if
28: end for
29: end procedure
6.3 Complexity and Performance Analysis
In order to calculate the complexity of Algorithm 6, first we must consider the
number of one time operations. The first few steps (from entering the user to
assigning permission PR4) are a once-only activity and will have following time
complexity: O(1). On the other hand, the remaining steps run in a loop. The
number of iterations that the loop will execute depends on the number of junior
roles, as given in the following statements: for each of the junior roles, the above
loop considers the junior role associated with each of the higher level roles. Each
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of the higher level role has a defined number of junior roles. The loop in the above
algorithm goes through each of the junior roles associated with higher level roles.
These junior level roles will go through the loop and hence will contribute to the
complexity of the algorithm. The complexity can be given as follows:
O(total number of roles * number of junior role for each role)
Hence, the total complexity of the algorithm will be as follows:
O(1) + O(total number of roles * number of junior role for each role) = O(total
number of roles * number of junior role for each role)
The above analysis shows that, the higher the total number of roles, the more
time it may take to process the request. Similarly, a small number of roles will
lead to a quicker solution. However, having too few roles means no proper distri-
bution of authorities. Hence, it is crucial to have a good number of roles which is
just balanced enough to make the decision quickly and adequate enough for the
organization.
Also, we analyze the complexity of the extended inheritance model. The extended
role hierarchy adds the definition of rule type (
→
r ,
9
r ) which helps to reduce the
number of private roles. The rule evaluation complexity (REC) for the role inheri-
tance hierarchy is defined as REC = (|RH| + |PR|), and for the extended inheritance
model RECE = (|RH| + |PR.→r | - |PR.9r |) where |x| denotes the number of items
in x. Therefore, by assigning rule permissions as private or inheritable, the total
number of roles is reduced and the number of inheritance relationships decreases
and the number of user-role assignment relationships decreases. Also, this de-
creases the cost in rule evaluation. Figure 6.9 illustrates the complexity of rule
evaluation.
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Furthermore, to evaluate the performance and the impact of role hierarchy on the
reasoning and modularization model, we conducted a test based on the following
parameters. First, we increased the size of the ontology knowledge base in order to
investigate and identify the capabilities and shortcomings of our semantic reasoner
authorization model. We evaluated a simple direct query system to determine
the overhead for the SRAM. In the direct query, the user request sends a query
directly to the semantic repository without any restriction on access. The SRAM
model is evaluated with a single-role model and after that with the extended
inheritance model. As illustrated in Figure 6.10, the extended inheritance model
adds a slight overhead to our previous work because it supports the concept of
multiple inheritance.
Figure 6.9: Rule evaluation complexity for role inheritance hierarchy and for
the extended inheritance model
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Figure 6.10: End-to-end processing time of semantic authorization model and
the direct query system
6.4 Chapter Summary
Role hierarchy in the RBAC model is an effective concept that simplifies the
specification of the security policy in which roles have an inheritance relationship.
To improve the efficiency, role-based administration was introduced into the SRAM
access control model. Role-based administration is used to enhance the hierar-
chical model for accurately depicting permission inheritance and for supporting
private rules. Furthermore, with multiple inheritance, several conflicts can arise,
and a certain flexibility was incorporated to address this issue. The approach uses
a label-conflict resolution strategy whereby each role is equipped with a special
label to resolve conflicts by evaluating the special labels for the various access roles
and generate a resultant rule.
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The exchange of information has become a critical factor in many organizations.
For example, often organizations which are largely autonomous, distributed and
heterogeneous in various aspects including their goals, need to collaborate to better
achieve common or compatible goals. However, interoperability problems emerge
as these organizations may be heterogeneous, and achieving semantic interoper-
ability becomes difficult when organizations use different terminology and mean-
ings. Furthermore, in heterogeneous semantic systems, automating the process of
mapping is difficult due to structural heterogeneity - differences in the types and
structures of the elements. In addition to mapping, the representation of mappings
is also of significant concern. In this work, we aim to enhance interoperability in
order to enable two or more semantic store systems to exchange information and
to use the information that has been exchanged. Information-sharing not only
needs to provide accessibility to the data; it also requires the accessed data to
be processed and interpreted by another semantic store system. Here, we present
heterogeneous middleware security policies in order to secure semantic interoper-
ability and address heterogeneity between semantic databases by identifying the
related mapping bridge between semantic systems. Figure 7.1 clarifies this concept.
Figure 7.1: Interoperation Semantic System
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Many research works focused on ontology mapping which could provide a com-
mon layer from which several ontologies can be accessed [Doan et al., 2002; Serafini
et al., 2005; Stuckenschmidt and Uschold, 2005; Tang et al., 2006; Wang et al.,
2010b]. This chapter highlights the need to enhance authorization security across
semantically heterogeneous repositories. As mentioned in Chapter 3, substantial
work on semantic ontology security has been done in an attempt to control access
to a single ontology store. Enabling secure information-sharing among heteroge-
neous semantic repositories faces different challenges:
- How to interoperate among semantically heterogeneous repositories efficiently?
- How to design fully supported content-based access control to secure shared
semantic knowledge base content?
- How to handle the corresponding confidentiality concerns of the organizations
involved in information-sharing?
- How to design a mediation system model which ensures flexibility of control
and secure knowledge-sharing heterogeneity?
Heterogeneity presents challenges in terms of developing a flexible model that
works well in different semantic technological contexts. Therefore, a certain flex-
ibility is required when designing an efficient authorization control mechanism
across heterogeneous repositories. The efficiency requirement means that, in prac-
tice, additional restrictions need to be placed on the models to ensure more con-
trolled reasoning. In fact, mediation security measures need to be implemented
which can ensure that the security policies of one system are respected by the
other, and vice versa.
The key aims of this chapter are to:
- Propose a highly-structured multi-layered authorization control for safeguard-
ing semantic data across semantically heterogeneous repositories;
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- Design TBox access control which protects the semantic models’ concepts and
their relationships;
- Design a mediator ABox trust level management which grants trust-level-
dependent permissions to the user in order to access ABox facts in the domain
knowledge;
- Introduce mediator TBox bridge rules for semantic mappings which express
how to match heterogeneous semantic repositories via the mappings.
The Mediator Authorization-Security model is proposed to secure access across se-
mantically heterogeneous repositories and addresses these fundamental challenges.
The Mediator Authorization-Security model has several unique features, that are
as follows: it performs semantic TBox access control based on the RBAC model
which mandates access to the TBox objects. Requests from users are always di-
rectly checked against the access control rules of the local semantic database and
are not sent or allowed access via the mediator. It also has a middleware-based
architecture which performs mapping between semantic ontology resources and
the ABox trust management level which is utilized for restricting access to the
ABox individuals at a more fine granular level.
7.1 The Mediator Authorization-Security Model
Architecture
The proposed model architecture is shown in Figure 7.2. The architecture has
three main components: the semantic TBox access control, the mediator TBox
mapping bridge and the mediator semantic ABox trust management. The se-
mantic TBox access control performs access control checks on the user’s query
requests. The mediator TBox mappings correspond to collections of TBox bridge
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Figure 7.2: The Mediator Authorization-Security Model Architecture
rules that express how to match heterogeneous semantic repositories by means of
the mappings. The mediator semantic ABox trust management determines the
level of trust for a subject to access a resource. In the following sections, we de-
scribe the main components of the mediator prototype. The complete algorithm
of the Mediator Authorization-Security model is presented in Algorithm 8.
The Mediator Authorization-Security architecture’s components are detailed as
follows:
In the top-level, TBox Access Control is utilized to protect the semantic model’s
concepts and their relationships. The authorizations can be articulated by rules as-
serting the access privileges that a user’s role has to every TBox object. Therefore,
the security policy comprises a set of authorization rules that dictate the condi-
tions under which users (roles) will be allowed access to TBox objects. The control
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system of the TBox access enforces the security rules and determines whether the
TBox objects can be accessed. Semantically speaking, the access control of the
TBox is a vital stage in the architecture for the protection of TBox ontology
objects and for generating the authorized access list for the user’s role. In the
following, we introduce the definition of TBox syntactic policy that formalizes the
TBox access authorization system. We identify the role and permission rules as
our fundamental semantic security system building blocks. We have used the same
TBox syntactic policy as that used in Chapter 5. Two short definitions are offered
as follows:
Definition 19 (TBox Syntactic Policy). TBox syntactic policy is defined as
a term of type R×PR where: Ri ∈ R: the role of the user in this policy, and PRi
∈ PR: the matching capability rules.
A TBox syntactic policy is a collection of authorization policy elements (Definition
6).
Definition 20 (Initial Authorized access list (IA)) The initial authorized
access list contains the authorized TBox concepts of the source ontology that are
allowed to be accessed by the user’s role.
Traditionally, when a user sends a query to a semantic ontology store, the semantic
TBox access control system checks the user role permissions to see if the user has
access to the TBox object. For example, consider two semantic ontology stores,
SOi(A) and SOj(B), in two organizations A & B. As the user does not know
the semantic ontology store schema in Org.B, s/he writes the query against Org.A
ontology schema. When the user acting in a role from SOi(A) submits a request to
access the TBox, the TBox access control system retrieves the user/role permission
rules from Org.A to determine whether the user’s role has permission to access the
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requested TBox object. If such matching rules exist, it uses these rules to generate
the initial authorized access list (IA) for the user’s role.
In rule evaluation, we have used the same method as in Section (5.4). Instead
of summarily rejecting such a query, the TBox access control system propagates
decisions based on the taxonomies of concepts in order to ensure there are other
permission rules that fit the user’s role request. More precisely, assume that the
user acting in a role submits a query to access a concept and the concept in
a query has positive or negative authorization. Then, the TBox access control
will search along the concept taxonomy to discover whether the user has positive
authorizations at its subconcepts level and returns those authorizations. Figure
7.3 illustrates the propagation decision technique used in the design and imple-
mentation of the semantic TBox access control system. When the evaluation is
completed, the initial authorized access list is generated by applying authorization
rules (Definition 20).
Figure 7.3: Example of the propagation decision technique along the concept
hierarchy
Definition 21 (Final Authorized access (FA)) The final authorized access list
(FA) contains TBox resources in the target ontology that correspond to the initial
authorized access list elements in the source ontology and can be accessed by the
user’s role from the source ontology.
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In the center-level, TBox Mapping Bridge shows how to match heterogeneous
semantic repositories by means of the mappings. Description logic has been implic-
itly adopted as a suitable formal tool to represent the ontology layer. In this part,
we need a natural generalization of the DL framework designed to formalize mul-
tiple ontologies interconnected by semantic mappings. Ontologies correspond to
description logic theories (TBox), while semantic mappings correspond to collec-
tions of TBox bridge rules which express how subsumption migrates from semantic
ontology store SOi to semantic ontology store SOj by means of the mappings.
Many research developments show how ontologies are mapped by enabling se-
mantic relations between homogeneous components of different ontologies to be
expressed; that is, they allow the mapping of concepts to concepts, individuals to
individuals and properties to properties [Doan et al., 2002; Serafini et al., 2005;
Stuckenschmidt and Uschold, 2005; Tang et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2010b]. Many
real cases, however, highlight the need to set up semantic relations between het-
erogeneous ontology components, for example, mapping a concept into a hetero-
geneous concept or mapping a concept into a relation or vice versa. To support
the interoperability of ontologies, we therefore need a mapping technique with
constructs for the representation of heterogeneous mappings.
Semantic mappings between different semantic ontology stores are expressed via
TBox bridge rules. We introduce the following definitions to formalize this con-
cept. To make every description distinct, we formalize each semantic ontology
store with a prefix index. For example, the concept C that occurs in the i -th
ontology store is denoted as i:C, and the j prefix index refers to the the concept
or property in the j -th ontology store.
Definition 22. An expression TBox bridge rule is a mapping that takes one of
the following three forms:
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(1) i:C
.→ j:N
(2) i:C
.→ j:P
(3) i:C
.→ j:N, j:P, j:M
where C is the concept in the i-th ontology store and N and M are concepts in the
j-th ontology store, and P is a property in the j-th ontology store.
.→ represents
the mapping bridge between two TBox ontologies which maps an access to objects
from the source ontology to the target ontology.
TBox Bridge rules do not define semantic relations stated from an external ob-
jective point of view. However, TBox bridge rules from i to j describe relations
between i and j that are allowed to be viewed by the subject role of the i -th on-
tology. Therefore, a set of TBox mapping bridge rules describes direct access from
the source ontology to the target ontology. The TBox mapping bridge consists of
three elements:
+ a source element, which is a concept of the source ontology;
+ a target element, which is either a concept, a property or TBox object of the
target ontology.
+ the type of mapping
.→ which represent the bridge from the source ontology
to the target ontology.
The abovementioned mapping categories are discussed in the following.
Expression: Bridge rule (1), the concept-into-concept bridge rule i:C
.→ j:N states
that the bridge rule from i:C to j:N allows users in the i -th ontology store to access
the concept (N ) in the j -th ontology store.
Bridge rule (2), the concept-into-property bridge rule i:C
.→ j:P allows users in
the i -th ontology store to access the property relationship with their domain and
range object concepts in the j -th ontology store.
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Bridge rule (3), the concept-into-TBox object bridge rule i:C
.→ j:N, j:P, j:M
allows users in the i -th ontology store to access the specified TBox objects in the
j -th ontology store.
Figure 7.4 illustrates the idea of the ontology TBox mapping bridge. After apply-
ing the TBox mapping bridge, a final authorized access list (FA) is generated, as
described in Definition 21.
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Figure 7.4: Example of Ontology TBox Mapping Bridge
In the lower level, ABox Trust level Management is used to grant trust-level-
dependent permissions to the user’s role in order to access facts in the domain
knowledge. To explain the ABox Trust level management, some terminology is
defined as follows:
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- Role. User’s role access protected resources.
- Trust level. For a subject role to access a resource, it must claim a trust level.
- Trust evaluation module. Trust evaluation is the process of verifying the
trust level of a subject’s role.
- Trust specification module. Trust specification is responsible for storing
and managing users’ roles and trust level relation.
Definition 23. A trust level is defined as L = Trust level, Trust level ∈ [High,
Medium, Low, nil].
Definition 24. RT ⊆ Role × Trust Level defines the role-trust level assignment
relation.
Specifically, four security trust levels (Nil Trust (NT), Low Trust (LT), Medium
Trust (MT), and High Trust (HT)) are defined here. The number of levels and their
meanings can vary in different scenarios, and does not affect model functionality.
A single trust level can be assigned to many roles. The restriction on role (Role,
Trust level) ∈ RT can have only one trust value.
The trust level acts as a confidence level for disclosing protected resources to this
user’s role. Trust levels in the roles can be granted by a trust specification module.
It is responsible for defining and managing the role-trust level assignment relation.
It stores the relation in a semantic repository. The trust evaluation module com-
putes the trust level for the role. It analyses information about past interactions
that a user’s role has had with the semantic repository system, including recom-
mendations about the user’s role and/or knowledge about other characteristics of
the user’s role. So the trust level could change by the trust evaluation module as
shown in Figure 7.5. It also stores the resulting value in the semantic repository
kept in the trust specification module.
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Figure 7.5: Example: trust changes for a user’s role from HT to MT then to
LT
Based on the trust level, the system then determines whether the trust level meets
the determined secrecy level of the ABox object triples with the dominance re-
lation: the role’s security trust level has to match or exceed the privacy level of
the ABox triple’s in order to be granted access. Note: ABox individual objects
basically consist of a triple: subject or resource, predicate or property, and object
or value, so, we use the term “ABox triple ti” to refer to a unique fact in the ABox
store. We establish the definition to formalize this concept as follows (Figure 7.6
shows an example):
Definition 25 (Trust Dominance). The simple security property formulating
the dominance relationship between the trust level of the user and the secrecy level
of FAn ABox triples is defined as follows:
user’s role
Access→ ti ↔ Secrecy Level(ti) ≤ Trust Level(user′s role)
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Figure 7.6: Example of Trust Dominance
For example, in the proposed mediator model, a user with a higher trust level
could be assigned higher level ABox objects and be granted access to the whole
level. A user with nil trust level returns empty results.
Algorithm 8 The Mediation Algorithm
Input: Query Q, User’s Role (Semantic Ontology Store SOi)
Output: Triple Object (Semantic Ontology Store SOj)
1: Basic Query Analysis
2: Parse Query Q to identify the target TBox object (T) in Q
3: Summarize list of all T requested triple patterns
4: Send T(s) to Semantic TBox access control
5: TBox access control system
6: Access control checks on the user query requests.
7: Retrieve the appropriate policy rule based on request
8: Evaluate user request with policy rule
9: if user role could not match any policy then
10: Return “Failure”
11: else
12: Generate the IA for the user’s role.
13: end if
14: TBox Mapping Bridge
15: Lookup the ontology TBox mapping bridge
16: if IA does not provide any mapping bridge to SOj then
17: Return “Failure”.
18: else
19: Retrieve the appropriate matching TBox object and
20: Generate FA
21: end if
22: ABox Trust Management
23: Trust Leveli
Maps→ role
24: Submit FA to semantic store SOj with role-trust level
25: Generate the result
26: Transfer results objects to the user’s role through the mediator
27: and object transfer
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7.1.1 Semantic Payload Caching
The querying of a remote semantic repository may be very expensive because
of high communication costs. This section highlights the issues related to query
optimization in a semantic mediator system.
In the Mediator Authorization-Security model, due to performance reasons, se-
mantic payload caching functionality is provided in the mediator whereby some
ABox objects can be stored for rapid access. Determining frequently-accessed
data is a matter of judgment and engineering. We have to answer two fundamen-
tal questions in order to define a solid caching strategy. What resources should be
stored in the cache? For how long should the resources be stored in the cache?
We now define the semantic payload caching architecture. We use the method
of the lookup layer from Chapter 4 in order to provide fast lookups for ABox
data in the semantic payload cache and semantic backend database. The semantic
payload caching architecture consists of two basic tiers:
- A hierarchic data structure “ABox Tree” (A-tree) is a novel indexing tree
that helps to query the engine quickly and locate the objects. The structure
of the A-tree has two node levels. Level 1 nodes hold the property values.
Each node has a pointer to a payload of subject and object values that
represent each property value in the payload bucket which represents the
level 2 nodes (Figure 7.7). Cache comes into play because the pointer might
point to the semantic payload cache or to the semantic backend database.
- A semantic payload cache consists of ABox objects which represent non-
sensitive ABox data from the original semantic database. All the “sensitive”
ABox objects are maintained in the backend semantic repository. Sensitive
ABox data is specified based on the property value. This is managed and
updated based on a semantic repository administrator. Cache ABox objects
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are loaded into the semantic cache automatically by the cache manager which
also performs automatic memory management by monitoring the amount of
memory available and used.
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Figure 7.7: A-tree lookups
For example, let us consider the example in Figure 7.7. We have two property val-
ues held in the A-tree: p1 and p2 have a pointer to the semantic payload cache. In
regard to p3, because it is considered to be sensitive property, the property payload
stays in the semantic backend database. This A-tree layer provides fast lookups
for ABox data in the semantic payload cache and semantic backend database. The
proposed method has several advantages as follows:
- It helps to locate objects quickly in both the database and the payload cache.
- It exploits the fact that some of the actual data is always in main memory
together with the tree so that they contain just the pointers to the actual
data fields.
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- Searching A-tree means that all leaves are at the same depth. There is no
runaway pointer overhead.
Regarding the time that the resource should be stored in the cache, cache ABox
objects have expiry times and can remain in the semantic cache until they expire
or new ABox objects over write them.
There is no definite rule regarding the size of the cache. Cache size depends on
the available memory and the underlying hardware viz. 32/64 bit and single-
core/multicore architecture. An effective caching strategy is based on the Pareto
principle (that is, the 80-20 rule). For example, on the e-commerce book portal,
80 percent of the book requests might be related to the top 10,000 books. The
application’s performance will greatly improve if the list of top 10,000 books is
cached, (see Figure 7.8) [Gadkari, 2013].
Figure 7.8: General view of the cache size and performance
Secure semantic payload caching system during update: Simultaneous ex-
ecution of transactions on data in the semantic payload cache can create data
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integrity and consistency problems such as lost updates and inconsistent retrievals
[Coronel et al., 2012]. For example, if someone is reading from a semantic caching
at the same time as someone else is updating to it, it is possible that the reader
will see a half-updated or inconsistent piece of data. Therefore, we look at con-
currency control in order to achieve consistency in semantic payload caching in
the mediator access manager system. The strategy used is for read-mostly data
where it is critical to prevent access to stale data in a concurrent operation in the
rare case of an update. The strategy is required if updates to the entity are being
cached. The process is represented by Algorithm 9. The write-through strategy is
implemented, and during an update operation, read requests to the semantic cache
are buffered and sent to the original semantic repository server, which hosts the
primary copy. Then, the original semantic repository server processes the requests
while the semantic cache is being updated with the ABox objects from the original
semantic server. This process is considered the simplest to implement and offers
good performance.
Algorithm 9 Cache concurrency strategy control
1: while (no request) do
2: Semantic cache update
3: end while
4: while (request == ‘read’ and update cache = yes) do
5: send requests to the original semantic repository server
6: execute requests with the original semantic repository server
7: update semantic cache with data
8: send success message back to cache server
9: end while
10: after update, send requests back to semantic cache
7.2 Motivational Case Study
To illustrate the procedures of the model, we use a portion of the NASA Inves-
tigation Organizer’s (IO) ontology which is designed to rectify any mishap in the
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conducting of investigations [Carvalho et al., 2005]. IO offers a common reposi-
tory for a broad assortment of mishap-related data. It permits investigators to
create shared, precise, as well as meaningful connections between causal models,
evidence, recommendations, and findings. It has been utilized to support inves-
tigations pertaining to a broad range of aerospace accidents. It assists in the
management and distribution of evidence, tracks the elements of the investiga-
tion’s progress, and supports the progress of the investigations. Also, we create
a hypothetical system/vehicle ontology store which is a part of another semantic
repository that describes information and the structure of the system design or
vehicle design, as shown in Figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9: (a) NASA Investigation Organizer’s (IO) ontology (b) System/Ve-
hicle ontology
When a user acting in a role from Org.A submits a request to access the TBox
objects in semantic ontology store Org.B, the request will be processed in the
following 6 steps.
Step 1: As the user does not know the semantic ontology store schema in Org.B,
s/he writes the query against the Org.A ontology schema. The query is analysed
in order to identify the target object that the user wants to access and then it is
sent to the semantic TBox access control system.
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Step 2: The TBox access control system retrieves the TBox rule policies of the
user’s role (Org.A) and enforces the security rules and determines whether the
TBox resource that the user’s role requested can be accessed and then generates
the IA for the user’s role.
Step 3: Ontology TBox Mapping checks the bridge relationship between the TBox
objects of the two ontology stores. For example, if the user’s role has a rule policy
to access a TBox object in Org.A, based on the TBox bridge rule, the role can also
access compatible objects in the other ontology store (Org.B). Thus, the user’s role
can access the TBox object of Org.B depending on his access in Org.A.
Let us suppose the user acting in a role in Org.A sends a request to retrieve infor-
mation about the “Physical evidence concept with relation SPart-Of and System
concept”. Let us consider that the user’s role has a rule granting access to the
requested items in the policy base of the TBox access control system, and the
following bridge rule exists:
a:C: System
.→ b:N: System, b:P: Composed Of, b:M: System Element
In the ontology TBox mapping bridge, each semantic ontology store has been
identified with the prefix index. As the user’s role can access the system concept
in this rule, based on the bridge rule, s/he is allowed to access the TBox objects
(i.e. System, Composed Of, System Element).
Step 4: In the ABox trust management, the user’s role is specified with a trust
level and based on this trust level, s/he will be allowed to access the triple objects
that do not exceed the secrecy level associated with the trust level.
Step 5: The filtered authorized semantic requests are translated and executed.
Firstly, the A-tree built into the mediator model helps locate objects quickly in
both the backend database and the payload cache. In case of a cache hit, the result
object will be returned quickly from the cache and without any communication
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with the store. Composed Of is considered to be sensitive property; therefore, the
property payload stays in the semantic backend database. In the A-tree layer,
Composed Of should have a pointer to the backend semantic database which will
help to quickly locate ABox individual objects in the backend semantic database.
Step 6: The resulting objects are returned to the user through the mediator and
object transfer.
7.3 Test Setting for Mediator Model
The Mediator Authorization-Security model for heterogeneous semantic reposito-
ries was implemented in Java. The Jena 2 Semantic Web Framework was used
for handling the ontology files. Jena SDB specializes in storing triples using re-
lational databases (“MySQL”). Several experiments on the NASA Investigation
Organizer’s (IO) ontology and System/Vehicle ontology were performed, where
both ontology stores have an individual organizational database managed by Jena
SDB.
Metadata and data sets: we generated the data sets for both the NASA In-
vestigation Organizer’s ontology and the System/Vehicle ontology. The ontology
data sources are heterogeneous in terms of the data model. In general, the NASA
Investigation Organizer’s ontology has 6 concepts and the System/Vehicle ontol-
ogy has 9 concepts. Also, the system ontology store contains about 1000 to 20000
individual knowledge bases. The parameters used are summarized in Table 7.1.
Parameter Setting
Number of individual knowledge bases 1000 to 20000
Number of rules 100, 200
Datasets System ontology
Table 7.1: Parameters and their settings
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Performance and Impact Studies: several tests were executed based on the
following three parameters.
- The impact of the knowledge base size on the mediator performance. The
Mediator Authorization-Security model performance is evaluated by increasing
the number of individual knowledge bases in the target semantic ontology.
- The impact of the number of access control rules. The Mediator Authorization-
Security model performance is evaluated by increasing the number of autho-
rization rules in the source semantic ontology. The number of rules used in
this experiment is 100 and 200 rules.
- Mediator performance is evaluated by introducing semantic payload caching.
To evaluate the impact of the knowledge base size on the mediator, we generate
one request to the NASA ontology database to query the System/Vehicle ontology
database using different dataset sizes as mentioned above. Figure 7.10 shows that,
when the knowledge data size increases, the time of the mediating increases, and
the time depends on the dataset size roughly linearly. The request is executed
multiple times in order to optimize the outcomes. Also, the experimental results
show that the size of authorization rules has a minor impact on the time of the
mediator. Also, the memory usage of the mediator system is investigated. Figure
7.11 shows the memory usage of the mediator system. As the amount of knowledge
increases, the memory consumption of the mediator system increases.
Furthermore, in the experiments, the user data request performance of the medi-
ator is evaluated by introducing semantic payload caching. The size of semantic
knowledge bases is about 20,000; five random queries have been performed. Fig-
ure 7.12 shows the results of request response times for Q1-Q5. In these tests, the
related ABox data of Q1-Q4 are stored in the semantic payload cache; whereas Q5
is stored in the backend semantic database.
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Discussion: Unlike traditional mediator technologies, we integrate into the me-
diator function the basic operation of semantic heterogeneity mapping and access
control. We show that despite performing ontology mappings, query translations
and request evaluations, the mediator still provides acceptable performance. In
addition, the introduction of a semantic payload cache into the mediator model
has reduced the response time by 13-22% as shown in Figure 7.12. It can be seen
that the mediator model showed a noticeable performance improvement on Q1-Q4.
On Q5, where the ABox data is held in the backend semantic database; this also
has shown a 4% reduction in response time due to the A-tree which is a hierarchic
data structure, helping to query the engine quickly and locate the objects. In sum-
mary, the Mediator Authorization-Security model facilitates collaboration among
semantically heterogeneous repositories with manageability, interoperability and
trust of collaborators.
Figure 7.10: The impact of the knowledge base size on the mediator perfor-
mance
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Figure 7.12: Evaluation of the mediator system and with enhanced semantic
caching
Chapter 7. Heterogeneous Semantic Knowledge Bases 155
7.4 Chapter Summary
Enabling the sharing of secure ontology knowledge bases among diverse organi-
zations will enhance the security cooperatives and collectives of semantic reposi-
tories. In this chapter, the Mediator Authorization-Security model was proposed
to provide secure interoperation among heterogeneous semantic repositories. The
Mediator Authorization-Security model resolves semantic heterogeneity and en-
ables access control checks which provide a secure environment. Experiments
were conducted in order to investigate the performance of the mediator system
and show the effect that the mediator model has on reasoning and modulariza-
tion. The evaluation showed that, despite the complexity of the mediator system,
it still provides acceptable performance. Also, in this work, we showed the advan-
tage of semantic payload caching in the Mediator Authorization-Security model.
A mediator may maintain a local cache consisting of ABox objects representing
non-sensitive ABox data, whereas all the “sensitive” ABox objects are maintained
in the backend semantic repository. Semantic payload caching helps to achieve
performance improvement in the mediator model.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusions and Future Work
Chapter Plan:
8.1 Summary of Results(157)
8.2 Directions for Future Work (161)
This thesis investigated the problem of access control in semantic data repositories.
The central objectives of this work were the design of a methodology to improve
storage efficiency and enable effective management of semantic data, and a frame-
work for authorizing access to semantic data through an inference policy engine.
Also, this work was extended to enhance authorization security across semanti-
cally heterogeneous repositories. A mediation system framework was proposed for
secure interoperation among heterogeneous semantic repositories. In the following
156
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sections, the major technical and empirical results of this thesis are discussed and
several directions for future work are given.
8.1 Summary of Results
The major results presented in this thesis can be categorized into four groups:
- A methodology to improve storage efficiency and enable effective manage-
ment of semantic data. The model also helps in designing flexible access
restrictions in a semantic repository.
- A framework to provide authorization control for a semantic data repository
through an inference policy engine.
- A methodology to enhance and propose a new way to administer the inher-
itance relations of a role hierarchy as well as conflict resolution strategies in
the authorization semantic access manager.
- A framework to provide secure interoperation among heterogeneous semantic
repositories to enable secure ontology knowledge base sharing among diverse
organizations.
The following sections summarize the conclusions of the chapters.
8.1.1 Semantic Storage System
To enforce semantic authorization control in semantic knowledge bases, a semantic
storage system should be considered. A methodology was proposed for enhancing
the semantic storage model in order to efficiently store a semantic knowledge base
and to enhance the authorization control system for safeguarding semantic data
repositories.
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The contribution of the research work documented here was the construction of
a semantic data storage layout for semantic systems that provides optimization in
terms of query time performance and storage. The proposed Semantic-Knowledge
model has four layers as follows:
• Inference Layer. This represents a query engine for the semantic repository.
It is used for interacting with the bottom layers of the architecture (lookup
and data layer).
• Schema Layer. This represents the TBox knowledge bases that consist of the
Schema-Level.
• Lookup Layer. This represents an index for the data layer.
• Data Layer. This represents the ABox knowledge bases that contain all the
statements about concept individuals and values.
The Semantic-Knowledge model is efficient since a single storage layer is changed
to a 4-tier architecture which provides optimization in terms of query perfor-
mance and storage. The architecture uses a large data store for ABox data which
is indexed to allow fast access and provides a semantic schema which defines a
hierarchical description of concepts and properties.
Results from the evaluation show that the Semantic-Knowledge model provides
improved performance and stores the semantic data completely with present hi-
erarchical knowledge whereby ontology concepts, properties and individuals are
mapped to the semantic storage layout represented by TBox axioms and ABox
facts. The experiments showed that the proposed storage method has, on average,
reduced execution time by 8%-15% compared with the Jena storage model.
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8.1.2 Inference Policy Engine
The granting of authorization privileges to the semantic model’s entities and their
individuals was addressed in order to prevent knowledge leakage and to maintain
high-quality services through secure access to the knowledge base. An authoriza-
tion security model was proposed that enforces access restrictions on a semantic
model’s entities and also propagates those restrictions on the entities’ individuals
in the semantic database through an inference policy engine. The proposed mech-
anism implements highly structured multi-layered authorization control for safe-
guarding semantic data repositories, with mechanisms that fully support concept-
and individual-based access control, so that the authorization requirements are
established not only for concepts in TBox, but also for their individuals in the
ABox. The technical contributions of the research work documented here are:
- An RBAC framework for the TBox access paradigm is used to protect the
semantic model’s entities (concepts) and their relations.
- Security clearance levels for the ABox are used to provide fine granularity
access control over ABox semantic individual data.
Experiments were conducted in order to evaluate the effects of access control on
reasoning and modularization. Results from the evaluation show that the autho-
rization model is scalable and does not affect reasoning results or modularization.
8.1.3 Role-based Administration
The semantic reasoner authorization model is enhanced with role-based adminis-
tration to enhance the hierarchical model and accurately depict permission inheri-
tance as well as support private rules. In order to reach this goal, each permission
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rule contains action, object and the rule’s mode. The model defines two modes:
inheritable and private. Role-based administration has the ability to configure the
mode of the rule. The advantages of role-based administration are summarized as
follows:
- The inheritance characteristic of the role hierarchy makes it effective for im-
plementing multi-level secure systems using role-based methods.
- Roles have been enhanced to support private rules which can be accessed only
by the role itself.
- The behaviour of roles has been enhanced to provide a separation-of-duty func-
tionality.
Furthermore, to address rule conflicts due to multiple inheritance, a label conflict
resolution strategy was proposed in which each role is equipped with a special label
to resolve conflicts by evaluating the special labels for the various access roles and
generate a resultant rule.
The results obtained from Chapter 6 have supported the proposed semantic rea-
soner authorization model in two ways: 1) ability to configure the mode of a
rule such as inheritable or private rule; 2) a more structured model for handling
conflicting rules.
8.1.4 Mediator Authorization-Security Model
The exchange of information has become a critical factor in many organizations.
For example, often organizations which are largely autonomous, distributed and
heterogeneous in various aspects including their goals, need to collaborate to better
achieve common or compatible goals. To address these challenges, the Mediator
Authorization-Security model was proposed to secure access across semantically
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heterogeneous repositories. The Mediator Authorization-Security model has sev-
eral unique features, that are as follows. It performs semantic TBox access control
based on the RBAC model in which it mandates access to the TBox objects. Re-
quests from users are always directly checked against the access control rules of
the local semantic database and not sent or allowed access via the mediator. It
also has a middleware-based architecture which performs mapping between se-
mantic ontology resources; and ABox trust management levels are utilized for
restricting access to the ABox individuals in a fine-grain manner. In the Mediator
Authorization-Security model, due to improved performance, a semantic payload
caching functionality was provided in the mediator whereby some of the ABox
objects can be stored for rapid access.
Results from the evaluation show that despite performing ontology mappings,
query translations and request evaluations, the mediator still provides acceptable
performance. In addition, the introduction of a semantic payload cache to the
mediator model has reduced response time by 4-22% as shown in Figure 7.12.
8.2 Directions for Future Work
Our framework might be extended in several directions.
• New results for problems and improved implementations of algorithms on
which this thesis is based could enable additional optimizations and could
further increase performance in practical scenarios. This might include de-
cision procedures, reasoning techniques, and pinpointing techniques.
• The results on restricting access to semantic data repositories have been lim-
ited to reading access. The approach might be extended to other operations,
such as writing, deleting or modifying objects.
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Although the above open research directions have been suggested by the results
of this thesis, we believe that the results presented in this thesis already will
facilitate the adoption of and increase interest in semantic repositories in enterprise
environments and any other environments that require putting and enhancing a
semantic access manager in semantic data repositories.
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